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Abstract: It has been forty-three years since the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of
Education. In this Article, the author argues that the Court's recent decision, Missouri v.
Jenkins, presages the end of court-enforced school desegregation. In addition, Jenkins shows
that the Court is unwilling to confront its doctrinal principles in the area, preferring instead to
base its decisions on relatively narrow, case-specific grounds. Jenkins therefore reveals that
the Court will end this important era in our constitutional history quietly, gradually and
without articulating its justifications. The author also contends that the reasons for curtailing
desegregation remedies proffered by Justices Scalia and Thomas in recent concurring
opinions, although perhaps more coherent and principled, do not justify the Court's
abandonment of court-enforced desegregation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On first impression, Missouri v. Jenkins' does not look like a
landmark in the Supreme Court's school desegregation jurisprudence.
The decision was quite important in Kansas City, of course, as it
effectively ended state funding for desegregation remedies; in the city's
schools,2 but neither of its two basic holdings substantially altered
constitutional doctrine. Nonetheless, Jenkins may be quite significant,
not for what the Court said, but for how it got there. Much of the Court's
reasoning in Jenkins was ill-conceived, if not disingenuous. The Court
misconstrued or ignored several well established doctrinal principles,
thereby allowing it to craft an opinion that undermined the district
court's justification for a majority of the desegregation remedies in place
in Kansas City. The manner in which the Court reached its holdings
shows that the Court's central concern was to end the extensive court-
ordered remedies.
The reasoning of Jenkins therefore signals an important shift in the
Court's approach to school desegregation cases. The Court used to
presume that, when a formerly segregated school district had failed to
eliminate all of the effects of past discrimination, the s -hool district
needed to "take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary
1. 1155.Ct.2038(1995).
2. Three weeks after the Court's decision in Jenkins, the plaintiffs, the school district, and the
State of Missouri reached a tentative agreement phasing out funding for desegregation remedies over
the next three years. See Kevin Q. Murphy et al., State, District Reach Accord: Desegregation
Funding to End by 1999 in KC School District, K.C. Star, July 8, 1995, at Al. The parties have yet
to agree on a final settlement of the litigation. See Donna McGuire et al., Scott, State Goes After
School Funds: District Could Lose Tens of Millions in 1996-97 Year, K.C. Star, Oct. 27, 1995, at
AI. On October 26, 1995, Missouri Attorney General Jay Nixon filed a motion seeking an end to all
desegregation programs in the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) by June 1996, as
well as asking the school district to repay the state $78 million for the state's share of previous salary
assistance. Id.
Vol. 71:597, 1996
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system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch."3 Now, however, the Court appears reflexively hostile to
extensive desegregation remedies and prolonged judicial supervision of
public schools. Accordingly, where the school district has implemented
its desegregation plan in good faith, the Court implicitly presumes that
the district court should return control to local officials as soon as
practicable, even if some of the effects of past discrimination remain.
Jenkins also demonstrates how the Court intends to bring the era of
court-enforced desegregation to a close. The Court has avoided any
explicit reexamination of the constitutional principles that underlie
remedies for school segregation. Indeed, it has offered no analytically
defensible rationale to justify its scaling back of court-ordered
desegregation. Instead, as Jenkins exemplifies, the Court has preferred
relatively narrow, case-specific reasons for ruling against the extension
or continuation of desegregation remedies and in favor of expediting the
return of control over public schools to local authorities. To borrow from
the Court's own terminology, it has embarked on a de facto, rather than a
de jure, dismantling of federal court supervision of formerly segregated
school districts.4 Thus, Jenkins signals not only that the end of court-
ordered desegregation is near, but that the Court will dispose of it
quietly, gradually, and without explicitly stating its justifications.
This message is especially clear once one views Jenkins as the last in a
trilogy of primary school desegregation cases decided by the Rehnquist
Court. In Board of Education v. Dowell,5 Freeman v. Pitts,6 and Jenkins,
the Court reached consistent outcomes, curtailing desegregation remedies
and expediting the return of control over formerly segregated school
districts to local officials, even if it chose different analytical routes. For
instance, in Freeman the Court emphasized the importance of deferring
to district courts' broad equitable powers,7 while in Jenkins it subjected
the district court's assertion of remedial authority to exacting scrutiny.8
And although none of the decisions explicitly questioned the principles
3. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968); see also United States v. Scotland
Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1972) (stating that formerly segregated school systems
must effectuate nothing less than "complete uprooting of the dual public school system").
4. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189,208 (1973) (distinguishing dejure from de facto
discrimination). More precisely, the Court has intentionally abandoned court-enforced
desegregation, but implicitly and incrementally rather than candidly and definitively.
5. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
6. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
7. See id. at 487-89.
8. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2052 (1995).
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of the Court's desegregation jurisprudence, each contained rhetoric
tacitly encouraging the abandonment of court-enforced desegregation.
What may be driving the Court's shift is an implicit reassessment of
the doctrinal principles, originally adopted in Green v. County School
Board,9 that form the basis of the Court's desegregation jurisprudence. In
recent concurring opinions, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have
questioned these principles, arguing that the Court substantially should
reform its approach to desegregation remedies. They have contended that
Green's premises have grown obsolete, or that Green's principles do not
reflect a faithful interpretation of Brown v. Board of Education0 or the
Equal Protection Clause. Perhaps a majority of the Court has been
persuaded by one of these arguments but, due to Greesn's symbolic
importance, is unwilling to state so explicitly.
Even if one of these rationales accounts for the Court's recent
desegregation decisions, however, the change in its approach still would
be unjustified. Although these arguments are more intellectually coherent
than the Court's uncandid, case-by-case approach, neither countenances
the Court's retreat from court-ordered desegregation.
This article explains how Jenkins reveals an important shift in the
Court's approach to school desegregation cases-a shift that presages the
end of court-enforced desegregation-and how the Court has failed to
articulate any principled rationale to justify this change. Part II briefly
describes the evolution of desegregation remedies law. It explains how
the Court in Green adopted a corrective (rather than prohibitory)
approach to remedies for school segregation, and how this approach's
practical implications are in tension with some of the basic tenets of the
Rehnquist Court's more recent holdings. Part III surveys the history of
the effort to desegregate the Kansas City, Missouri, S zhool District
(KCMSD), including the Supreme Court's ruling in Jenkins. Part IV
focuses on the Court's reasoning in Jenkins. It demonsixates that the
Court's analysis was disingenuous,1 thereby showing that the decision
reflected the Court's extrinsic goal of ending desegregation remedies in
Kansas City's schools. Part V places Jenkins in the context of the
Rehnquist Court's two previous primary school desegregalion decisions.
The results and rhetoric of the three cases make evident that the Court's
analytical premises have implicitly shifted. Finally, par: VI explores
9. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
11. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2061-73 (Thomas, J., concurring,; Freeman v. Pitts,
503 U.S. 467, 500-07 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Vol. 71:597, 1996
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more intellectually coherent rationales that could explain the Court's
implicit decision to scale back the availability and breadth of
desegregation remedies. Although these arguments are more analytically
defensible than the Court's current approach, they fail to justify the
Court's quiet revolution in desegregation law.
II. BROWN, GREEN, AND THE CORRECTIVE APPROACH TO
DESEGREGATION REMEDIES
In Brown, the Court emphatically ruled that de jure school segregation
violated the Equal Protection Clause: "[I]n the field of public education
the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal."' 2 But the rationale for Brown, and
therefore the precise characteristic of school segregation that offended
the Constitution, was unclear. 3 In one passage, the Court emphasized the
importance of public education generally, concluding that "[s]uch an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms."' 4 At the same time, the
Court stressed the detrimental psychological impact of segregation on
African-American children, stating that separating children "of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."' 5 These alternative
rationales obfuscated such issues as whether Brown applied only to de
jure segregation or to de facto segregation as well, and whether
segregation was unconstitutional only in public schools or in all facets of
public life. Thus, while Brown's core message was clear, what it required
of school districts was uncertain.
12. Id. at 495.
13. See Geoffrey Stone et aL., Constitutional Law 463-67 (2d ed. 1991); J. Harvie Wilkinson III,
From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration: 1954-1978, at 29 (1979);
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947, 1132-40
(1995); Peter M. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1041, 1049 (1984); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of
Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935, 946-51 (1989).
14. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493.
15. Id. at 494; see also Drew S. Days, Vindicating the Promise of Brown-School Desegregation
and the Civil Rights Act-Past, Present, and Future, 26 Pac. L.J. 772, 773 (1995) (noting "three
faces" of Brown-one declaring separate but equal unconstitutional in principle, one discussing
detrimental impact of segregation on black children, and one discussing provision of public
education as most important function of state and local government).
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The Court's equivocal opinion in Brown II a year later did little to
resolve these questions. In deliberately vague language, the Court ruled
that segregated school systems were required to "make a prompt and
reasonable start" toward "achiev[ing] a system of determining admission
to the public schools on a nonracial basis."' 6 Although the Court warned
that "the vitality of [Brown I's] constitutional principles cannot be
allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them,"' 7 it
nevertheless permitted school districts to dismantle their segregated
systems "with all deliberate speed."' 8 This phrasing further confused the
issue of how rapidly school districts needed to desegregate; indeed, the
phrase itself was oxymoronic. Hence, after the two Brown decisions,
what the Constitution required of segregated school districts in concrete
terms remained unclear. Most notably, neither Brown decision
definitively answered whether a formerly segregated school system's
abandonment of intentional discrimination was sufficient to satisfy its
constitutional obligations.
This uncertainty continued for the next thirteen years. In many
respects, practical considerations prevented the Court from addressing
these issues more explicitly during this period. Predictably, southern
resistance to desegregation was fieice.' Eight southern states adopted
resolutions of interposition declaring Brown illegitimate and denying the
Supreme Court's power to outlaw segregation, and enacted legislation
designed to thwart any efforts toward integration.2" Nineteen of the
twenty-two Senators and eighty-two of the 105 Representatives from the
eleven states of the old Confederacy (seventy-seven of eighty-three
Representatives excluding Texas) signed the Southern Manifesto in
1956, which declared Brown a "clear abuse of judicial power" and
pledged "to use all lawful means to bring about a reversal of this decision
16. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,300-01 (1955) (Brown 11).
17. Id. at 300.
18. Id. at30l.
19. See Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics i the South During
the 1950's 67-81 (1969); Albert P. Blaustein & Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., Desegregation and
the Law: The Meaning and Effect of the School Segregation Cases 240-71 (2d ed. 1962); Jack
Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts: How a Dedicated Band of Lawyers Foughtobr the Civil Rights
Revolution 212-24 (1994); Stone et al., supra note 13, at 470-71; Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of
Massive Resistance 41-70 (1973); Wilkinson, rupra note 13, at 24, 51-52, 61-127; James S.
Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90 Colum. L. Rev.
1463, 1587 (1990); McConnell, supra note 13, at 1133-34.
20. Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation: Desegregating the South During the
Decade after Brown, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 92, 93, ICO (1994).
Vol. 71:597, 1996
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which is contrary to the Constitution."2' In 1959, public schools in
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Florida
remained completely segregated;22 as late as 1964, only 0.48 percent of
African-American elementary or secondary school students in the South
(excluding Texas and Tennessee) attended school with whites.23 In this
climate, an announcement from the Court that Brown required no more
than the abandonment of state-imposed segregation would have been
seen as a capitulation to public pressure. This, in turn, would have
undermined significantly the Court's legitimacy and hindered efforts to
enforce even a narrow reading of Brown.
At the same time, interpreting Brown's mandate more expansively so
as to require school districts to remedy the effects of segregation (if that
is what Brown required) would have been futile. Congress and the White
House essentially did nothing to support the implementation of school
desegregation. 24 Although President Eisenhower reluctantly sent the
Army's 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock, Arkansas, to desegregate
Central High School in 1957,25 he refused to endorse the rightness of
Brown,26 subtly dignifying southern resistance.27 Members of Congress,
21. 102 Cong. Rec. H4515-16 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1956); United States Congress, Biographical
Directory of the United States Congress 1774-1989, at 415-19 (1989) (identifying size of respective
congressional delegations). The three southern senators not to sign the Manifesto were Lyndon
Johnson of Texas and Estes Kefauver and Albert Gore of Tennessee. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice
752(1977).
22. Douglas, supra note 20, at 94.
23. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 50 (1991).
24. Id. at 46.
25. Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters 222-24 (1988). Eisenhower's reluctance to use federal
executive power to enforce Brown was deeply ingrained. At a press conference two months before
the Little Rock crisis, he stated: ."I can't imagine any set of circumstances that would ever induce
me to send federal troops into ... any area to enforce the orders of a federal court .... I would never
believe that it would be a wise thing to do in this country."' 2 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The
President 410 (1984). A year earlier, Eisenhower had refused to intervene after mob violence
erupted in Clinton, Tennessee, and in Mansfield, Texas, in response to court-ordered desegregation.
Id. at 336.
26. In 1956, Eisenhower stated, "'I think it makes no difference whether or not I endorse [Brown].
The Constitution is as the Supreme Court interprets it; and I must conform to that and do my very
best to see that it is carried out in this country."' Ambrose, supra note 25, at 338; see also Michael J.
Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 Va. L. Rev. 7, 131 (1994)
(noting that, in addition to his public equivocation, "[p]rivately, Eisenhower criticized the Brown
decision in strong terms on numerous occasions"). In fact, the Eisenhower Administration
successfully fought against legislation that would have given the Justice Department the authority to
bring suits on behalf of desegregation plaintiffs in 1957. Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 46.
27. Ambrose, supra note 25, at 409 ("The President's moderation, the southerners felt, gave them
license to defy the Court."); Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 266 (2d ed. 1986);
Greenberg, supra note 19, at 213 (stating that Eisenhower's equivocal statements about Brown,
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through the Southern Manifesto and other means, openly encouraged
school districts' recalcitrance.28 For instance, in a typical speech in 1956,
Senator James Eastland told constituents in Mississippi t.aat "[o]n May
17, 1954, the Constitution of the United States was destroyed because the
Supreme Court disregarded the law and decided integration was
ight.... You are not required to obey any court which passes out such a
ruling. In fact, you are obligated to defy it."29 Many judges in the South
refused to enforce the law, upholding statues clearly designed to evade
Brown, sanctioning delay by school officials, and expressly approving
the continuation of segregation.30 The Supreme Court clearly was aware
of the lack of support for school desegregation.3 ' Thus it knew that even
if Brown required school districts to do more than simply refrain from
intentional discrimination, there was no hope of enforcing such a
holding.
The political climate surrounding civil rights began to change,
however, in the middle 1960s.32 Events in the modern civil rights
movement made continuing prejadice against African-Americans a
national political issue. In particular, the violent resistance to the
desegregation of the University of Mississippi by James Meredith,33 the
"which could be read as a rejection of the wisdom in the Court's decision, surely encouraged some to
express themselves in more extreme fashion"); Kfuger, supra note 21, at 753 ("Eisenhower, either by
design or by obtuseness, comforted and dignified those who were ranged against the Court.").
28. Greenberg, supra note 19, at 213 (contending that "if the executive branch was derelict [in
supporting Brown], Congress was downright antagonistic"); Kluger, supra note 21, at 752-53.
29. Wilkinson, supra note 13, at 69. In introducing the Southern Manifesto on the House floor,
Representative Smith of Virginia stated that the Supreme Court in Brown had "threaten[ed] the
liberties of the people and the destruction of the reserved powers of the respective States, in
contravention of the principles of that Constitution which all officials of all the tl-ree departments are
sworn to uphold." 102 Cong. Rec. H4515 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1956) (statement of Rep. Smith). And
on a separate occasion, Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina called for the impeachment of
justices and called the Court "a great menace to this country." Greenberg, supra note 19, at 213. In
the wake of Brown, several senators, including Thurmond, Eastland, and Hcrman Talmadge of
Georgia, joined groups such as the White Citizens Council, whose sole purpose was to preserve
segregation. Id. at 216.
30. Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 88-91. For instance, in one Georgia case, a lederal district court
judge refused to enforce Brown and instead "held extensive hearings ... to uFhold the thesis that
Negroes were of a lower standard of 'educability' than white students." Stell v. Board of Pub. Educ.,
387 F.2d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 1967).
31. See Kluger, supra note 21, at 753 (explaining that "the Justices were deep y resentful over the
White House's failure to lend its great persuasive powers to supporting the rightness of the Brown
decision"); Earl Warren, The Memoirs of Earl Warren 291-92 (1977) (revealing Chief Justice
Warren's disillusionment with Eisenhower's unwillingness to support Brown).
32. See Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 94-97.
33. See Branch, supra note 25, at 656-72. Riots at Oxford, Mississippi, in September 1962-
provoked largely by Governor Ross Barnett's refusal to permit the desegrega:ion of Ole Miss-
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Southern Christian Leadership Conference's (SCLC) campaign to
desegregate lunch counters in Birmingham, Alabama,34 and voter
registration efforts in Mississippi" exposed the intensity and virulence of
southern racism. No longer was the question of segregation a regional
matter that the rest of the country could ignore. The year after the March
on Washington, at which Martin Luther King delivered his "I Have a
Dream" speech, President Johnson signed into law the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,36 which, among other things, allowed the Justice Department to
bring suits against school districts on behalf of desegregation plaintiffs.37
A year later, Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 (ESEA),35 which made billions of dollars available to public
school districts. Because Title VI of the Civil Rights Act forbid racial
discrimination by entities receiving federal funds,39 the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) could make the disbursement of
these funds contingent on school districts' abandonment of segregation.4 °
Gradually, this financial incentive to desegregate provided by the ESEA,
resulted in two deaths and hundreds of injuries, and caused President Kennedy to send 10,000
federal troops to quell the disturbance. Id. at 662-70.
34. See id. at 756-78. In the course of the anti-segregation demonstrations, Commissioner of
Public Safety Bull Conner turned the city's high-powered fire hoses and police K-9 units on
defenseless African-American children, injuring hundreds. Id. Also significant in raising national
consciousness was the bombing of Birmingham's Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in September
1963, which occurred just after the SCLC and city leaders had reached an agreement to desegregate
the city's public accommodations. Id. at 888--92. The bomb killed four young girls who were
attending Sunday school. Id.
35. Most notoriously, a rural deputy sheriff, Cecil Price, and a group of accomplices murdered
three civil rights volunteers in June 1964 near Philadelphia, Mississippi. See Juan Williams, Eyes on
the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years, 1954-1965, at 229-49 (1987). The three volunteers
disappeared on June 21, 1964, just as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) was
launching its 1964 Summer Project to register blacks to vote. Id. at 230. Instrumental to attracting
national attention was that two of the volunteers-Andrew Goodman and Michael Schwemer-were
whites from New York City. Id. The third volunteer was James Chaney, an African-American native
of Mississippi. Id. at 231. Their disappearance attracted such notoriety that, while the search for the
men continued, President Johnson met with the parents of Goodman and Schwemer at the White
House. Id. Finally, on August 4, 1964, FBI agents discovered the bodies of the three men buried in
an earthen dam. Id. at 234. They had each been shot to death, and Chaney had been savagely beaten
before being killed. Id. at 235. Murder charges against Price and his accomplices, brought in state
court, were ultimately dropped, but they were later were convicted of violating the volunteers'
federal civil rights. Id.
36. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1989 & Supp. 1994)).
37. Id. § 407, 78 Stat. 248. On the connection between these events in the civil rights movement
and the passage of federal civil rights legislation, see Klarman, supra note 26, at 129-49.
38. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27-58.
39. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 252-53 (1964).
40. See Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 47-50; Klarman, supra note 26, at 43 & n. 160.
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coupled with the Justice Department's active involvement in
desegregation litigation, caused many school systems to abandon their de
jure policies and desegregate their schools. By the 1966-67 school year,
16.9 percent of African-American children in the South attended
integrated elementary and secondary schools.4
By 1968, then, the climate was more conducive for the Supreme Court
to clarify the remedies mandated by Brown, and the case presenting that
opportunity was Green. Until 1965, New Kent County, Virginia, had
enforced an official policy of segregated education; it operated one
combined elementary and high school for white students and one school
for blacks.42 The County was residentially integrated, so students were
bused in both directions across the County to the one-race schools.43
Prior to the 1965-66 school year, the school board adopted a "freedom of
choice" plan, which theoretically permitted all students in the district to
attend either of the two schools.' The plan resulted in little integration.
In 1967, only 115 black students attended the formerly all-white school,
and no white students attended the all-black school; thus, eighty-five
percent of the County's African-American students still attended an all-
black school.45 The plaintiffs did not allege that the school board had
adopted the "freedom of choice" plan with discriminatory intent, but that
Brown required more of formerly de jure school districts than race
neutrality.46 To comply with Brown, they asserted, New Kent County
needed to produce actual integration in its schools.
41. Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 50.
42. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 432-33 (1968). The County "initially established
and maintained [the de jure system] under the compulsion of Virginia constitutional and statutory
provisions mandating racial segregation in public education." Id. at 432. It retained the de jure
system until 1965, "presumably on the authorit of several statutes enacted by Virginia in resistance
to the Brown decisions." Id. at 433.
43. Bowman v. County Sch. Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 1967) (en banc) (Sobeloff, J.,
concurring) (explaining that "eleven buses traverse the entire county to pick u, the Negro students
and carry them to the Watkins school, located in the western half of the county, and ten other buses
traverse the entire county to pick up the white students for the New Kent school, located in the
eastern half of the county"), rev'd, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
44. Green, 391 U.S. at 433-34. The County adopted the plan so it could remain eligible for
federal financial assistance from HEW. Id.
45. Id. at 441.
46. Bowman, 382 F.2d at 327 (stating that plaintiffs "contend[ed] that compulsive assignments to
achieve a greater intermixture of the races, notwithstanding their individual choices, is their due");
Lino A. Graglia, When Honesty Is "Simply ...Impractical" for the Supreme Court: How the
Constitution Came to Require Busing for School Racial Balance, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1153, 1158
(1987) (book review) (noting that NAACP Legal Defense Fund attorneys reprrsenting plaintiffs in
Green had "stipulated that the school system was being operated free of racial discrimination").
606
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The crucial question posed by Green was whether Brown endorsed a
prohibitory or a corrective approach to desegregation remedies.47
According to the prohibitory approach, segregation's harm ends once it
no longer carries official sanction. Under this view, Brown required
formerly segregated school districts to abandon government-imposed
segregation and adopt racially neutral policies, nothing more.48 Remedies
should be forward-looking; upon a finding of liability, district courts
should order school districts to refrain from discriminating in the future.49
The corrective approach, in contrast, envisions the harm caused by
segregation, and therefore the appropriate remedy, much more broadly.
Under the corrective theory, "[tihe violation consists of acts and
effects." 50 The victims of segregation are injured not only by state-
imposed segregation, but also by its continuing impact after the school
district has abandoned its de jure policies." Thus, formerly segregated
school districts must not just refrain from intentional discrimination; they
must also affirmatively eradicate any ongoing effects, such as de facto
segregation or reduced student achievement, traceable to the de jure
system.
Arguably, the most doctrinally coherent reading of Brown I and
Brown H saw those decisions as endorsing the prohibitory approach.5
47. See Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal,
86 Colum. L. Rev. 728, 738-54 (1986) (contrasting prohibitory and corrective approaches to
desegregation remedies, and explaining why Green endorsed the latter) [hereinafter Gewirtz, Choice
in the Transition]. Gewirtz has explained the essential differences between the two approaches as
follows:
The prohibitory approach is narrow; ... it views the goal of antidiscrimination law as simply
stopping new violations of the [antidiscrimination] principle. It is completely future-oriented.
The corrective conception, by contrast, requires significant measures to eliminate the ongoing
effects of discrimination: it requires remedial intervention that goes beyond the prohibitions of
the antidiscrimination principle itself, since merely assuring prospective adherence to that
principle will not undo continuing effects of past violations.
Id. at 731.
48. Id. at 739 (noting that under prohibitory approach "the remedy is limited to ordering new
violations to cease").
49. Liebman, supra note 19, at 1526 (explaining that under prohibitory approach, "[s]chool
officials found to be utilizing discriminatory admissions practices [w]ould be ordered to desist and to
admit black children to their schools on a 'nondiscriminatory basis' of those officials' choice").
50. Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition, supra note 47, at 732.
51. Liebman, supra note 19, at 1501 (stating that, "[a]ccording to the Correction theory,
segregation involves an official's or agency's evil act with evil effects").
52. Mark Tushnet has written that the view that Brown did not require integration but "'merely
forbids the use of governmental power to enforce segregation' ... was almost universally shared in
the years immediately following Brown." Mark Tushnet, The Significance of Brown v. Board of
Education, 80 Va. L. Rev. 173, 175 (1994) (quoting Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777
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The Court in Brown I had emphasized the unlawfulness of segregation
"when it has the sanction of law."53 The Court stated that "'[s]egregation
with the sanction of the law... has a tendency to [retard] the educational
and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some
of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school
system."' 5 4 This language at least implied that segregation persisting
after the abandonment of de jure discrimination-unaccompanied by the
force of law-did not violate the Constitution; such lingering de facto
segregation, because it no longer carried the stigma inherent in official
discrimination, did not constitute an injury of constitutional significance.
Thus, a school district that no longer intentionally discriminated on the
basis of race had fulfilled the mandate of Brown, even if its schools
remained racially imbalanced.
Likewise, in Brown II the Court stated that the relief to which the
plaintiffs were entitled was their "admission to public schools as soon as
practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis."55 The Court ordered the
defendant school districts "to achieve a system of determining admission
to the public schools on a nonracial basis., 5 6 This language seemed to
suggest that the Court merely contemplated the end of race-based
policymaking by school districts. The remedy was a prohibition on
school systems' use of race in assigning their students to particular
schools. Nowhere in either of the Brown decisions did the Court
insinuate that school systems also might be affirmatively obligated to
undo the ongoing effects of their past de jure discrimination.
The Court's few pronouncements on school desegregation between
1955 and 1968 also tended to support the prohibitory approach. In Goss
(E.D.S.C. 1955)). According to Tushnet, although black plaintiffs challenged facially neutral policies
in these years, they did so "only on the ground that they were government actions used
disingenuously to perpetuate segregation." Id. at 176. This hypothesis is corroborated by a statement
made in 1959 by Jack Greenberg, one of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund attomeys who litigated
Brown. He then stated that if"there were complete freedom of choice, or geographical zoning, or any
other nonracial standard, and all Negroes still ended up in certain schools, there would seem to be no
constitutional objection." See Greenberg, supra note 19, at 383. Greenberg subsequently disavowed
this opinion, stating during oral argument of Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968) (a
companion case to Green), that "I did not know then what I know now." Greenberg, supra note 19,
at 383.
53. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (Brown ]).
54. Id.
55. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,300 (1955) (Brown fl).
56. Id. at 300-01.
57. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467. 503-04 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The
constitutional right is equal racial access to schools, not access to racially equal schools .... We
apparently envisioned no more than this in our initial post-Brown cases.").
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v. Board of Education," the Court rejected a minority-to-majority
transfer plan that permitted students to transfer from schools in which
they were a racial minority to schools where their race predominated. 9
The Court ruled that, because the plan made "[c]lassifications based on
race," which "are 'obviously irrelevant and invidious,"' 60 it was "no less
unconstitutional than [a plan] us[ing race] for original admission or
subsequent assignment to public schools.",6' But the Court noted that it
"would have [been] an entirely different case" if the opportunity to
transfer had been "made available to all students regardless of their race
and regardless as well of the racial composition of the school to which he
requested transfer., 62 And in Cooper v. Aaron63 (the decision culminating
the litigation to desegregate Little Rock's Central High School), the
Court equated "desegregation" both with "the immediate general
admission of Negro children, otherwise qualified as students for their
appropriate classes, at particular schools," and with "the elimination of
racial discrimination in the public school system." 64
But the Court charted a different course in Green. It held that New
Kent County's "freedom of choice" plan, although not adopted with
discriminatory intent, was insufficient to discharge the school board's
duties under Brown.65 The Court emphasized that desegregation plans
were to be judged by their effectiveness, not the intent with which they
were adopted.66 That a school board has abandoned its facially
discriminatory policies "merely begins, not ends, our inquiry whether the
58. 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
59. Id. at 685-86.
60. Id. at 687 (quoting Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192,203 (1944)).
61. Id. at 688.
62. Id. at 687.
63. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
64. Id. at 7. Several lower court decisions between Brown and Green also endorsed the
prohibitory approach. See, e.g., Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332, 336-37 (4th Cir. 1963),
rev'd, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Boson v. Rippy, 285 F.2d 43, 45-46 (5th Cir. 1960); Borders v. Rippy,
247 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1957); Jackson v. School Bd., 203 F. Supp. 701 (W.D. Va. 1962), rev'd,
321 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1963); Brown v. Board of Educ., 139 F. Supp. 468 (D. Kan. 1955); Briggs v.
Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
65. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968) ("The New Kent School Board's
'freedom-of-choice' plan cannot be accepted as a sufficient step to 'effectuate a transition' to a
unitary system.").
66. Id. at 437 (stating that the district court "must measure the effectiveness of respondent School
Board's 'freedom-of-choice' plan to achieve [the] end" of a racially nondiscriminatory school
system); id. at 439 ("The obligation of the district courts, as it always has been, is to assess the
effectiveness of a proposed plan in achieving desegregation.").
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Board has taken steps adequate to abolish its dual, segregated system. '
Facially neutral policies, in and of themselves, are "'only a means to a
constitutionally required end--the abolition of the system of segregation
and its effects.""'6 Thus, any desegregation plan "will require evaluation
in practice, and the court should retain jurisdiction until it is clear that
state-imposed segregation has been completely removed.'r
69
Specifically, effectiveness meant the elimination of existing
conditions traceable to the de jure system. In Green, these conditions
were racial imbalances in the various facets of the school systems'
operations, such as student assignments, staff and faculty assignments,
transportation, extracurricular activities, and school facilities.7" School
boards like New Kent County's that had "operat[ed] state..compelled dual
systems were... charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."7' Because the
County's freedom of choice plan failed to eliminate these imbalances-
failed to achieve actual integration--the school board had not discharged
its duties under Brown.
The Court's decision in Green endorsed two distinct principles. First,
Green embraced the corrective approach to desegregation remedies,
holding that Brown required formerly segregated school districts not just
to refrain from discrimination but to eradicate the effects of de jure
segregation.72 Current conditions in a nonunitary73 school district that are
67. Id. at 437.
68. Id. at 440 (emphasis added) (quoting Bowman v. County Sch. Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 333 (4th Cir.
1967) (en banc) (Sobeloff, J., concurring), rev'd, 391 U.S. 430 (1968)).
69. Id. at 439.
70. Id. at 435 ("Racial identification of the system's schools was complete, extending not just to
the composition of student bodies at the two schools but to every facet of school operations-
faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities.").
71. Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added).
72. Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition, supra note 47, at 739-40 (noting that "Green cemented the
Court's commitment to a corrective conception of an antidiscrimination remedy").
73. The term "unitary" refers to a school system-or an aspect of a school system--that no longer
contains any vestiges of the prior regime of state-imposed segregation. Sec Board of Educ. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 246 (1991). Conversely, a school district is "nonunitary' if vestiges of the de
jure system remain. A formerly segregated school district that has achieved "unitary status" has
satisfied the requirements of Brown; its legal obligations are the same as a school district that never
unlawfully discriminated. Bradley W. Joondeph, Note, Killing Brown Softly: The Subtle
Undermining of Effective Desegregation in Freeman v. Pitts, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 147, 150 (1993). Thus,
upon a finding of unitary status, judicial supervision ends, and control returns to local officials. Id.
Similarly, a school district achieves "partial unitary status" when it removes all vestiges of
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traceable to the de jure system, such as racial imbalances in student
assignments or reduced student achievement, are "vestiges" of the school
district's past discrimination; to comply with the Constitution and end
federal court supervision, formerly segregated school districts must
eliminate all such vestiges of the de jure era. This means that in cases
like Green, where de facto segregation persists after de jure segregation
ends, school districts must eliminate those racial imbalances-in essence,
affirmatively integrate their schools--to comply with Brown.
Second, Green created a presumption of causation linking current
conditions in nonunitary school districts to those districts' past de jure
segregation. That is, Green shifted the burden of proof with respect to the
cause of current conditions allegedly traceable to past discrimination,
such as ongoing de facto segregation or reduced student achievement.74
In any district where there has been a de jure violation, such conditions
are presumed to be the result of the past segregation. School districts can
rebut this presumption by establishing that these conditions are the result
of other factors, such as intervening demographic shifts.75 But unless the
school system makes such a demonstration, the court will consider those
conditions vestiges of the de jure system that the school district must
affirmatively eliminate to comply with the Constitution and end judicial
supervision.
Together, these two principles require that the remedies in most
desegregation cases be extensive and intrusive. Ridding a formerly de
jure school system of all vestiges of discrimination is no small task; it
essentially demands the elimination of all significant racial imbalances in
all facets of the system's operations, including student and faculty
assignments, extracurricular activities, and transportation. In cases like
Jenkins, where de jure segregation has caused a reduction in student
achievement, the vestiges of discrimination may be even more
intractable. And because of Green's presumption of causation, the only
way for a nonunitary school district to avoid responsibility for remedying
discrimination from one or more discrete aspects of its operations, such as student assignments,
faculty assignments, or extracurricular activities. See id. at 157-58.
74. See Liebman, supra note 19, at 1511. Liebman attributes this presumption to the Court's
decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), rather than
Green, calling it the Swann "continuing-effect" presumption. Liebman, supra note 19, at 1511.
Although Swann was the first decision in which the Court articulated this presumption explicitly, it
was reiterating what it had decided implicitly in Green. See Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition, supra
note 47, at 751.
75. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496-97 (1992) (holding that, because current racial
imbalances in school district's student assignments were attributable to intervening demographic
changes, school district had achieved partial unitary status with respect to student attendance).
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all such conditions is to prove that those conditions are unrelated to past
discrimination. Until the school district becomes actually integrated at
some point subsequent to the finding of liability, proving ihe lack of any
causal connection is nearly impossible.76
Nonetheless, Green's basic principles have endured. The Court
expressly has reaffirmed the corrective approach to desegregation
remedies in nearly every desegregation case subsequent to Green,
making clear that, as a doctrinal matter, "[t]he duty and responsibility of
a school district once segregated by law is to take all steps necessary to
eliminate the vestiges of the unconstitutional de jure syslem."" And in
several opinions, the Court formally has recognized the Green
presumption of causation, a principle that was merely implicit in Green
itself.78 These precepts have justified the imposition of extensive
desegregation remedies by federal courts in hundreds of public school
districts, and they have resulted in federal judicial supervision over many
school districts lasting more than twenty years.79 Indeed, federal courts
76. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 745 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (characterizing
Green presumption as "often irrebuttable in practice"); Freeman, 503 U.S. at 505 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (calling the presumption "effectively irrebuttable (because the sciool district cannot
prove the negative)").
77. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 485; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2049 (1995) ("The
ultimate inquiry is ... whether the vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the
extent practicable") (citations and quotation marks omitted); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S.
237, 250 (1991) (stating that district courts must assess "whether the vestiges of discrimination
ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable"); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977)
(Milliken I1) ("[T]he burden of state officials is... to take the necessary steps 'to eliminate from the
public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.') (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 15); Davis
v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971) ("Having once found a violation, the district
judge or school authorities should make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation.").
78. See, e.g., Fordice, 505 U.S. at 745 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[O]ur decisions following
Green indulged the presumption, often irrebuttable in practice, that a presently observable imbalance
has been proximately caused by intentional state action during the prior dejure era."); Freeman, 503
U.S. at 494 ("The school district bears the burden of showing that any current [racial] imbalance is
not traceable, in a proximate way, to the prior violation."); id. at 505 (Scalia, J., c.ncurring) ("[O]nce
state-enforced school segregation is shown to have existed in a jurisdiction in 1954, there arises a
presumption, effectively irrebuttable (because the school district cannot prove the negative), that any
current racial imbalance is the product of that violation, at least if the imbalance has continuously
existed."); Swann, 402 U.S. at 26 (stating that where there exist racially identifiable schools in a
nonunitary school district, "the burden upon the school authorities will be to satisfy the court that
their racial composition is not the result of present or past discriminatory action on their part").
79. See, e.g., United States v. Franklin Parish Sch. Bd., 47 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 1995) (judicial
supervision began in 1970 and is still in place); Dowell v. Board of Educ., 8 F.3d 1501 (10th Cir.
1993) (judicial supervision over Oklahoma City schools lasted from 1960 un:il 1991); Keyes v.
Congress of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274 (D. Colo. 1995) (terminating judicial
supervision over Denver schools after school district had operated under desegregation decree for 25
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continue to supervise scores of formerly segregated school districts
today,t" even in cases where de jure segregation ended in 1954. 81
These consequences of the Court's desegregation remedies
jurisprudence, however, are in fundamental tension with three of the
Rehnquist Court's core values. First, the remedial framework dictated by
Green effectively requires that desegregation remedies be race-
years); Lee v. Geneva County Bd. of Educ., 892 F. Supp. 1387 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (school district,
found liable for segregation in 1967, still under judicial supervision); Stanley v. Darlington County
Sch. Dist., 879 F. Supp. 1341 (D.S.C. 1995) (school system still under court supervision, first found
liable in 1964), rev'd in part, 84 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 1996); Tasby v. Woolery, 869 F. Supp. 454 (N.D.
Tex. 1994) (finding that Dallas Independent School District had achieved unitary status after being
under court supervision since 1955); Tim Bryant, Delay in Desegregation Hearing Sought, St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Jan. 20, 1996, at A6 (St. Louis schools under judicial supervision since 1972); Tim
Comell, Hub Eyes Greater School Choice, Boston Herald, Jan. 7, 1996, at I (Boston school district
under court order since 1974); John Egerton, Putting a Finer Finish on Integrated Metro Schools,
Tennesseean, Jan. 28, 1996, at ID (Nashville, Tennessee, schools under court supervision since
1955); James Heany, School Woes Pose a Big Hurdle, Buffalo News, Jan. 24, 1996, at Al
(discussing settlement in Buffalo desegregation case, which had lasted since mid-seventies); Sharon
L. Jones, Was Court Oversight of Schools Worth It?, San Diego Union-Trib., Dec. 20, 1995, at AI
(San Diego schools under court supervision since 1967); Peter Shinkle, Change of Heart
Underscores Shift in Desegregation, Sunday Advoc., Mar. 31, 1996, at I B (discussing 40-year-old
desegregation case in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana); Susan C. Thomson, Little Rock Schools
Chief Ready to Meet St. Louis, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 6, 1996, at IA (Little Rock, Arkansas,
schools under supervision since 1957); Linda K. Wertheimer, Modified Busing on Easy Road?
Orange Stands Apart from Other Districts, Orlando Sentinel, Feb. 5, 1996, at C I (Orange County,
Florida, school system under supervision since 1971); All Things Considered: Alternatives Sought to
Replace Unliked Busing System (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 15, 1996) (discussing ongoing
desegregation litigation in Hillsborough County, Florida, where the school district has been under
judicial supervision since 1971);
80. The precise number of formerly de jure school districts that remain under the supervision of
federal courts is unclear. A recent survey indicated that approximately 13% of U.S. school districts
had some sort of desegregation plan in place for the 1991-92 school year. David J. Armor, Forced
Justice: School Desegregation and the Laiv 166 (1995). Of these plans, roughly half were imposed
by a court or some other governmental entity. Id. at 213. These figures indicate that the number of
school districts operating under court-ordered desegregation plans in 1992 was somewhere betveen
500 and 2000. Cf Kevin Brown, After the Desegregation Era: The Legal Dilemma Posed by Race
and Education, 37 St. Louis U. L.J. 897, 898 (1993) (stating that, in summer of 1993, there were
"over 500 school districts under some form of court supervision"); Peter Applebome, Opponents'
Moves Refueling Debate on School Busing, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1995, at Al (reporting that federal
government has filed briefs in 513 ongoing school desegregation cases, and that there may be at least
that many cases in which federal government is not involved). This figure, however, probably
understates the impact of these court-ordered plans, as a greater percentage of larger school districts
are still implementing desegregation remedies. Armor, supra, at 166. The survey for the 1991-92
school year cited by Armor revealed that "about 32% of all medium-sized and larger school districts
are subject to a current desegregation plan." Id.
81. In Jenkins, for instance, the State and the KCMSD abandoned their policies of de jure
segregation in 1954, but the school district has yet to achieve unitary status and is still under federal
court supervision. And the schools in Topeka, Kansas--original defendants in Brown I-are still
under the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 978 F.2d 585 (10th Cir.
1992) (Brown 111), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 903 (1993).
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conscious. If desegregation plans must be effective, and effectiveness
means actual integration, then district courts must consider race in
assessing whether a school system's desegregation plan has produced
sufficient racial balance. Where effective desegregation has not occurred,
district courts must take race into account in ordering remedies--such as
grade reorganization, gerrymandered attendance zones, or busing--that
achieve actual integration. But race-conscious governmental action is
anathema to the Rehnquist Court."2 In recent decisions, the Court has
stated that "classifications of citizens solely on the basis o f race 'are by
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality"'83 and "threaten to stigmatize individuals
by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial
hostility." 4 The Court has held that all racial classifications, including
those aimed at remedying identified acts of past discrimination, are
unconstitutional unless "they are narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental interests. 8 5
Second, prolonged federal court supervision of public school districts
violates traditional norms of federalism, principles that have taken on
greater constitutional significance under the Rehnquist Court. 6 The
82. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 64 U.S.L.W. 4437,4400 (U.S. June 13, 1996) ("Racial classifications
are antithetical to the Fourteenth Amendment, whose 'central purpose' was 'to eliminate racial
discrimination emanating from official sources in the States."') (quoting McLaugliin v. Florida, 379
U:S. 184, 192 (1964)); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2118 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part) ("In my view, government can never have a 'compelling interest' in
discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite
direction."); id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) ("In my mind, government-sponsored racial
discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious
prejudice. In each instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple.").
83. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81, 100 (1943)).
84. Id.
85. Adarand Constructors, 115 S. Ct. at 2113; see also Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2482
(1995) ("Laws classifying citizens on the basis o" race cannot be upheld unless they are narrowly
tailored to achieving a compelling state interest.").
86. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), to hold that Congress lacks authority under the Commerce Clause to
abrogate states' sovereign immunity); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990 unconstitutional as beyond Congress's power under Commerce
Clause); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (holding that federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act did not preempt state law damages actions); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down Federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act's "take
title" provision-which required states either to take ownership of low level waste or regulate its
disposal according instructions of Congress-as unconstitutional "commandeering" of states'
regulatory powers); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (holding that Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) does not proscribe stat,:s' from imposing mandatory retirement ages on
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remedies required by Green have resulted in federal courts supervising
and controlling formerly de jure school districts for as many as thirty
years, placing federal judges in a role traditionally reserved for state and
local authorities. Such protracted federal court supervision is in tension
with the Rehnquist Court's suspicion of federal encroachment on matters
traditionally of state and local concern, particularly public education. For
instance, the Court recently held in United States v. Lopez87 that
Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in
criminalizing the possession of firearms near public schools largely
because public education is a subject over which "States historically have
been sovereign."88 Thus, according to the Rehnquist Court's vision of the
appropriate allocation of power between the federal and state
governments, a remedial framework producing prolonged federal
supervision over public school districts is necessarily suspect.89
state judges; displacing state prerogatives in determining qualifications of state government officials
disrupts usual balance between federal and state powers, and therefore Congress needed to make this
intention clear, which it did not do in ADEA); cf Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 65 (1989) (stating that "if Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the
States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute") (internal quotations omitted). See generally Robert Marquand, Rehnquist-
Led Court Shifts Power to States, Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 17, 1996, at 1. The principles of
federalism have been especially important in the Rehnquist Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence.
See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (holding that federal habeas claims on
which state prisoner has defaulted due to state procedural rule are barred absent showing of cause
and prejudice or fundamental miscarriage of justice, overturning "deliberate bypass" standard as
"based on a conception of federallstate relations that undervalued the importance of state procedural
rules," and stating that cause and prejudice standard recognizes "the significant harm to the States
that results from the failure of federal courts to respect them"); McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491
(1991) (holding that state prisoner commits abuse of writ if he files second habeas petition without
demonstrating cause and prejudice for his failure to raise claims therein in his first petition, stating
that "[o]ur federal system recognizes the independent power of a State to articulate societal norms
through criminal law; but the power of a State to pass laws means little if the State cannot enforce
them"); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (holding that new constitutional rules are not
applicable on collateral review of convictions that have become final before rule is announced,
stating that "the 'costs imposed upon the State[s] by retroactive application of new rules of
constitutional law on habeas corpus ... far outweigh the benefits,"' and that "retroactive application
of new rules may be more intrusive on states' autonomy than enjoining criminal prosecutions
because it continually forces the States to marshal resources in order to keep in prison defendants
whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards") (quoting Solem v.
Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 654 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring).
87. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
88. Id. at 1632; see also id. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "it is well established
that education is a traditional concern of the States").
89. See. e.g., Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) (invoking "[c]onsiderations
based on the allocation of powers within our federal system" in holding that the school district was
not obligated to continue implementing its desegregation plan).
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Finally, judicial supervision of public school districts conflicts with
the Rehnquist Court's complimentary emphases on judicial restraint and
courts' limited institutional competence." Until formerly de jure school
districts achieve unitary status, supervising federal courts must make
several educational policy decisions. To evaluate the promise or success
of a desegregation plan, a court must immerse itself in the details of
public school administration: the drawing of attendance zones, the hiring
and transferring of faculty and staff, the location of new schools or
magnet schools, capital improvements to the school district's facilities,
and perhaps even curricular choices. 9' The law of desegregation remedies
has placed federal judges in the position of making many important
educational policy decisions that would otherwise be made by local,
politically accountable authorities. Such responsibilities are well beyond
that considered appropriate under a more restrained vision of the
judiciary's institutional competence, forcing courts to fulfill largely
legislative and executive functions. Advocates of judicial restraint argue
90. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2061 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The
necessary restrictions on [federal courts'] jurisdiction and authority contained in Article III of the
Constitution limit the judiciary's institutional capacity to prescribe palliatives fo societal ills."). An
excellent illustration of this strain in the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence has been its decisions
involving the constitutional rights of prisoners. In a series of rulings, the Cour: has reiterated that
prison regulations are constitutional so long as they are reasonably related to leg itimate penological
objectives, even when the regulations substantially encroach on inmates' fundamental rights. See,
e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (upholding state policy that permitted corrections
officials to administer antipsychotic drugs to inmates against their will without prior hearings);
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) (upholding Federal Bureau of Prisons regulation
permitting wardens to screen magazines sent to inmates and to reject those detrimental to security or
discipline); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (upholding prison regulations that
prevented Muslim inmates from attending particular congregational service); Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78 (1987) (upholding regulations that restrcted correspondence between inmates at different
institutions to that between family members and trat concerning legal matters unless correspondence
was in "best interests" of inmates). In so holding, the Court has emphasized that it generally is not
the judiciary's place to stand in judgment of how prison administrators carry out their duties. See
Harper, 494 U.S. at 224; OLone, 482 U.S. at 350; Safley, 482 U.S. at 89. For instance, the Court
stated in Abbott that, "[a]cknowledging the expertise of [prison] officials and that the judiciary is 'ill
equipped' to deal with the difficult and delicate problems of prison management, this Court has
afforded considerable deference to the determinations of prison administrators." Abbott, 490 U.S. at
407-08. And in OLone the Court pronounced: "We take this opportunity to reaffirm our refusal,
even where claims are made under the First Amendment, to 'substitute our judgrr ent on ... difficult
and sensitive matters of institutional administration' for the determinations of tho3e charged with the
formidable task of running a prison." O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 353 (citation omitted, (quoting Block v.
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588 (1984)); see also id. at 350 (emphasizing "the respect and deference
that the United States Constitution allows for the judgment of prison administrators").
91. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2070 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurr ng).
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that courts possess neither the expertise nor the political legitimacy to
make these decisions.92
Given these tensions, it is unsurprising that the Rehnquist Court might
seek to curtail the availability and extensiveness of desegregation
remedies. Indeed, its two desegregation decisions prior to Jenkins-
Board of Education v. Dowell and Freeman v. Pitts-ended or scaled
back desegregation remedies in Oklahoma City and DeKalb County,
Georgia, respectively, hastening the end of judicial supervision in both
communities. It is against this background that the Court approached the
issues presented in Jenkins.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE JENKINS LITIGATION
The segregation of Kansas City's public schools dates to 1821, when
Missouri entered the Union as a slave state as part of the Missouri
Compromise.93 Until the Civil War, Missouri law prohibited the creation
of schools for African-American children.94 In 1865, at the conclusion of
the Civil War, Missouri immediately amended its constitution to include
a Jim Crow provision mandating separate schools for "white and colored
children,"95 and the state legislature enacted various statutes requiring the
same.96 Missouri schools remained segregated by law until the Supreme
Court decided Brown I in 1954. Shortly thereafter, the Missouri Attorney
General issued an advisory opinion stating that the state's school
segregation laws were no longer enforceable.97 The state legislature
repealed the state's segregation statutes in 1957, and the provision in
92. See id. ("When [federal courts] presume to have the institutional ability to set effective
educational, budgetary, or administrative policy, [they] transform the least dangerous branch into the
most dangerous one.").
93. 2 D.W. Meinig, The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of
Histoo , 453 (1993). Under the terms of the Missouri Compromise, Missouri entered the Union as a
slave state while (I) Maine simultaneously entered the union as a free state, and (2) the latitude of
Missouri's southern border-36°30' North-was set as the northern limit of slavery in the remaining
western territories. Id.
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her dissent, racial segregation in Missouri actually is traceable
to 1724, when Louis XV of France issued the Code Noir, a slave code for the Colony of Louisiana,
which at that time encompassed Missouri. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2091 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94. Act of Feb. 16, 1847, § 1, 1847 Mo. Laws 103 ("No person shall keep or teach any school for
the instruction of negroes or mulattos, in reading or writing, in this State.").
95. Mo. Const. art. IX, § 2 (1865); see also Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1305 (8th Cir.)
(en bane), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984).
96. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 29, 1866, § 20, 1865 Mo. Laws 177.
97. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1490 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
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Missouri's constitution was finally excised in 1976."8 One year later, the
tortuous litigation to desegregate Kansas City's schools began.
A. The Original Finding on Liability and Remedial Orders
In 1977, four members of the Kansas City School Board, their
children (KCMSD students), and the KCMSD itself brought suit against
the States of Kansas and Missouri, three federal agencies, and several
suburban school districts in Kansas and Missouri.99 The plaintiffs alleged
that, prior to 1954, the various defendants intentionally discriminated
against the KCMSD and its African-American students by maintaining or
contributing to a racially segregated system of education, and that they
subsequently had failed to fulfill their constitutional obligation to
dismantle the dual system. 00 In 1978, the district court dismissed the
claims against the State of Kansas and the Kansas suburban school
districts for want of personal jurisdiction, and it realigned the KCMSD as
a defendant.' The remaining plaintiffs-KCMSD students and their
parents-then filed an amended complaint, making the same allegations
against the school district, although their relationship rema:ned (and has
continued to be) one of "friendly adversaries."'0 2 In addition, the
KCMSD made a cross-claim against the State of Missouri seeking
indemnification for desegregation costs in the event the school district
was found liable.0 3
The trial on liability began in early 1984."' 4 After the plaintiffs had
presented their case, the district court dismissed all claims against the
Missouri suburban school districts. The court found that the plaintiffs
98. Id.
99. School Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421, 427 (W.D. Mo. 1978). The Kansas-Missouri
border forms the western boundary of the KCMSD, so many of the surrounding school districts are
in Kansas. The three federal agencies involved in the litigation were HEW, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the Department of Transportation (DOT).
100. Id. at 427-28.
101. Id. at 442,445.
102. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2044 (1995);Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1487.
103. Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1488-89.
104. Between Brown I and the trial on liability, the racial composition of the KCMSD changed
dramatically. In the 1954-55 school year, 18.9% of the district's students were African-American.
Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1492. In the 1984-85 school year, 68.3% of KCMSD sttdents were black,
and white enrollment had dwindled to 26.7%. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 36 (W.D. Mo.
1985), aff'd as modified, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987). The
remaining enrollment was comprised of Hispanic students (3.7%) and other minor ty groups (1.3%).
Id.
Vol. 71:597, 1996
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had failed to show that the suburban districts "had acted in a racially
discriminatory manner that substantially caused racial segregation in
another district."'' 0 5 Thus, a desegregation plan that mandated student
transfers across district lines between the KCMSD and the suburban
school districts (an interdistrict transfer plan) was unwarranted. The court
also rejected the plaintiffs' claims against the three federal agencies,
finding that none had engaged in intentional discrimination causing
segregation in Kansas City's public schools.0 6
The district court did find, however, that the State of Missouri and the
KCMSD were liable for continuing racial segregation within the
KCMSD (intradistrict segregation).0 7 Until 1954, the State of Missouri
had "mandated that all schools for blacks and whites in this State were to
be separate,"' t and the KCMSD, like "[e]ach school district in
Missouri[, had] participated in this dual system."'0 9 The district court
determined that "[v]estiges of that dual system still remain,""' 0 and that
"the State and the KCMSD had and continue to have an obligation to
disestablish that system.""' In addition, the court ruled in favor of the
KCMSD in its cross-claim against the State for the State's role in failing
to desegregate the school district."'
The district court then proceeded to make findings, both in its liability
decision and in a series of subsequent orders, that detailed the lingering
effects of unconstitutional segregation within the KCMSD. Unlike most
desegregation cases, the most notable effect was not racial imbalances in
various facets of the school district, such as student and faculty
assignments." 3 Rather, the court concluded that "[s]egregation ha[d]
caused a system wide reduction in student achievement in the schools of
105. Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1488; see also id. at 1490 ("[N]o interdistrict constitutional violation
by any suburban school district was shown.").
106. Id. at 1488, 1506. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims against HEW and DOT at
the conclusion of the plaintiffs' presentation of evidence. Id. at 1488. Plaintiffs' claim against HUD
went to trial, after which the court found HUD was not liable. Id. at 1506.
107. Id. at 1506.
108. Id. at 1503-04.
109. Id. at 1490.
110. Id. at 1493.
Ill. Id. at 1504.
112. Id. at 1505.
113. Cf Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968) (involving school district where
"[r]acial identification of the system's schools was complete, extending not just to the composition
of student bodies at the two schools but to every facet of school operations-faculty, staff,
transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities").
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the KCMSD."' t 4 Only a handful of the KCMSD's fifty elementary
schools showed student test scores at or above national norms for reading
and mathematics." 5 The court attributed the student achievement to "the
inferior education indigenous of the state-compelled dual school
system.""' 6 The court also found that de jure segregation had triggered
demographic shifts in Kansas City that contributed to the KCMSD's
racial isolation. Specifically, the court stated in an unpublished order that
the defendants' constitutional violations had "led to white flight from the
KCMSD to suburban districts... [and to] private schools."" 7
To address these vestiges of the de jure system, the court ordered a
wide range of compensatory programs "appropriate to remedy the ill
effects of the unconstitutional segregation and to attract and maintain
non-minority enrollment."' t 8 The Supreme Court had approved such
compensatory programs as a remedy to de jure segregation in Milliken v.
Bradley (Milliken i)." 9 In that case, the district court had found that a
114. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 24 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (emphasis omitted), aff'd as
modified, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987). In its original remedial
order, the court did not elaborate as to exactly how de jure segregation had had this effect; rather, it
cited the expert testimony of Drs. Daniel Levire and Eugene Eubanks, and then enumerated the
indications that student achievement in the KCMSD was well below national norms. Id. at 24-25. In
its initial liability finding, however, the court described how segregation had caused lower student
achievement in Kansas City:
[F]orced segregation ruins attitudes and is inherently unequal: "[Segregation] may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." The general attitude of inferiority among
blacks produces low achievement which ultimately limits employment opporttnities and causes
poverty. While it may be true that poverty results in low achievement regardless of race, it is
undeniable that most poverty-level families are black.... The Court finds the inferior education
indigenous of the state-compelled dual school system has lingering effects in the Kansas City,
Missouri School District.
Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1492 (citations omitted) (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
494 (1954) (Brown l)).
115. Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 24. The court specifically found that "[tiest results from the Iowa
Test of Basic Skills in grades I through 6 show that there are only a few elementary schools of the
50 in the KCMSD which are presently performing at or above the national norm in reading and
mathematics. This is especially true in regard to the basic skill of reading." Id.
116. Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1492; see also Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 28 (staling that "education
process ha[d] been further 'bogged down' in the KCMSD by a history ofsegregaed education").
117. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2084 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Jenkins v.
Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1302 (8th Cir. 1988)).
118. Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 24. As discussed in detail infra, the question of whether segregation
in KCMSD caused white students to leave the district, and therefore whether attracting and
maintaining nonminority enrollment was a permissible objective for the district court's remedy, was
the primary issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Jenkins. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2048-55.
These questions are addressed later. See infra notes 236-293 and accompanying text.
119. 433 U.S. 267 (1977); see also Betsy Levin, School Desegregation Remedies and the Role of
Social Science Research, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1978, at 1, 30-35.
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variety of measures, such as a remedial reading and communications
skills program, an in-service teacher training program, and the reform of
biased testing procedures, were necessary to return students in Detroit
public schools to the position they would have enjoyed had the school
district and the State of Michigan not engaged in unlawful
discrimination. 2 The Supreme Court held that desegregation remedies
need not be limited to initiatives that promote greater racial balance in
student or staff assignments within a school district even if the
constitutional violation related only to those factors...' "[D]iscriminatory
student assignment policies can themselves manifest and breed other
inequalities built into a dual system founded on racial discrimination.
Federal courts need not, and cannot, close their eyes to inequalities,
shown by the record, which flow from a long standing segregated
system.
' ' 22
The compensatory measures (or Milliken II programs) ordered by the
district court in Jenkins covered virtually every aspect of the KCMSD's
operations. The court ordered the KCMSD to hire more certified
librarians, reduce instructors' teaching loads, add more art and music
classes to the curriculum, and hire several guidance counselors.,2  It also
ordered the district to reduce its class sizes and to implement summer
school, full-day kindergarten, before- and after-school tutoring, and early
childhood development programs. 2 In addition, the court mandated the
120. Milliken H1. 433 U.S. at 274-77; see also id. at 282 ("These specific educational remedies,
although normally left to the discretion of the elected school board and professional educators, were
deemed necessary to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have
enjoyed in terms of education had these four components been provided in a nondiscriminatory
manner in a school system free from pervasive de jure racial segregation.").
121. Id. at 283.
122. Id. The Court further observed:
Children who have been thus educationally and culturally set apart from the larger community
will inevitably acquire habits of speech, conduct, and attitudes reflecting their cultural isolation.
They are likely to acquire speech habits, for example, which vary from the environment in
which they must ultimately function and compete, if they are to enter and be a part of that
community....
Pupil assignment alone does not automatically remedy the impact of previous, unlawful
educational isolation; the consequences linger and can be dealt with only by independent
measures. . . .The root condition shown by this record must be treated directly by special
training at the hands of teachers prepared for that task.
Id. at 287-88.
123. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 26-28 (W.D. Mo. 1985), affd as modified, 807 F.2d
657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987).
124. Id. at 28-33.
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implementation of an "effective schools" program, an extensive magnet
school plan, and a $200 to $300 million capital improvement plan. 21
B. The KCMSD Litigation, 198'7-1994
Both sides appealed the district court's judgment.126 The plaintiffs
challenged the court's refusal to order a mandatory interdistrict transfer
plan involving the suburban school districts, while the State and the
KCMSD contested the scope of the remedies and the allocation of costs
between the defendants. 2 7 The Eighth Circuit altered the district court's
orders slightly, so that the costs of reducing KCMSD class sizes be
divided equally between the State and the school district, 128 but it
affirmed the district court's judgment in all other respects. Both sides
petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, and the Court denied both
petitions. 
21
In 1987, as part of the compensatory education remedies, the district
court also directed the KCMSD and the State jointly to fund salary
assistance for KCMSD teachers and staff.30 The court stated that "the
KCMSD has an obligation not only to eliminate the effects of unlawful
segregation but also to insure that there is no diminution in the quality of
its regular academic program," and that it was "essential that the
KCMSD have sufficient revenues to fund an operating budget which can
provide quality education, including a high quality f.aculty."'' The
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment,3 : and while the
Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari, it did so only to
125. Id. at 33-35, 39-41 (ordering effective schools and magnet school plan); Jenkins v.
Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1306 (8th Cir. 1988) (referring to $200 to S300 million capital
improvement plan), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
126. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 660 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816
(1987).
127. Id. at 660-61.
128. Id. at 684.
129. Jenkins v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 816 (1987); Kansas City, Mo. Sch. Dist. v. Missouri, 484 U.S.
816(1987).
130. Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 410 (W.D. Mo. 1987), afT d in lpart and rev'd in part,
855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989). During that same year, the
KCMSD sought approval from the district court for its long-range capital irprovement plan. The
plan called for the renovation and construction of approximately 72 schools at a cost of $265 million.
Id. at 403. The State opposed the school district's motion and instead proposed a capital
improvement plan costing roughly $61 million. Id.
131. Id. at403.
132. Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
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review that aspect of the district court's opinion that ordered the school
district to raise local property taxes.'33
In 1992, the KCMSD asked for the continuation of salary relief for the
1992-93 school year through the 1994-95 school year. 34 The existing
salary assistance from the State, both from the original 1987 order as
well as a subsequent settlement between the parties in 1990, expired at
the conclusion of the 1991-92 school year. 3 ' Thus, without a
continuation of assistance, teacher salaries would have reverted to their
1986-87 levels, from an average starting salary of $22,215 to roughly
$17,000. 36 The State argued that continued salary relief was not justified
because the increase in salaries had produced "no demonstrable effect on
improving the KCMSD's ability to implement the desegregation
remedy."' 13 7 After a four-day hearing, the court rejected the State's
arguments and ordered the continuation of salary assistance on two
grounds. First, it was "critical to the success of the desegregation plan
that the employees who carry it out are compensated at or near the
relevant market rates of compensation so that the District can attract and
retain employees with the training and experience necessary to
implement the Court's plan."'38 Second, "[i]n order to improve the
desegregative attractiveness of the KCMSD, the District must hire and
retain high quality teachers, administrators and staff."'39
Also in 1992, the State filed a motion to have the school district
declared unitary with respect to the desegregation plan's compensatory
133. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). The Supreme Court's previous decision in the
Jenkins litigation concerned a tax increase necessary for the KCMSD to pay its share of the costs of
the desegregation plan. After the district court had ordered many of the compensatory remedies
comprised by the desegregation plan, it became clear that the KCMSD, due to state laws that
restricted local governments' ability to raise property taxes, would not be able to meet its obligation
to fund 25% of plan's costs. Id. at 41. The district court therefore ordered an increase in the ad
valorem property tax rate within the KCMSD from $2.05 to $4.00 per $100 valuation. Id. The
Supreme Court held that the district court's direct imposition of a tax increase violated the principles
of federal-state comity, and therefore constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. at 51-53. Nonetheless,
the Court upheld the order as modified by the Eighth Circuit, which held that the district court could
enjoin the Missouri laws that were preventing the KCMSD from being able to raise the necessary
funds. Id. at 53-59. The school district therefore was able to impose the tax increase itself. Id.
134. Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-WV-4, 1992 WL 551568, at *1 (W.D. Mo. June 25,
1992), aff'd, 1 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
135. Id.
136. Id. at *2.
137. Id. at *4.
138. Id. at *9.
139. Id. at *8.
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education programs. 4 Such a partial finding of unitary status would
have meant that the school district had achieved constitutional
compliance with respect to implementation of the compensatory
programs. 4' The State based its argument on the Supreme Court's
decision earlier that spring in Freeman v. Pitts.4 2 The State contended
that the compensatory education programs had been fully implemented,
and that the district court should therefore have relieved the State of its
obligation to continue funding them. 43 The district court did not
explicitly address the State's Freeman arguments,"4 but it ordered the
State to continue funding its share of the compensatory programs for the
1992-93 school year.'45
The State appealed both the salary relief order and the denial of its
motion for partial unitary status, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed both
rulings.'46 On the salary relief order, the court of appeals reiterated that
the relevant harm was "the systemic reduction of student achievement
and white flight[,] which require as part of the remedy quality education
programs and magnet schools."' 47 The court found no error in the district
court's conclusion that the salary relief was "necessary to implement the
desegregation plan," and the record contained "substantial evidence"
supporting the factual findings underpinning the order. 4 As to the
State's motion for partial unitary status, the court of appeals conceded
that the district court had not explicitly addressed the State's arguments,
but found it clear that the district court had considered and rejected
them." 9 The court looked to comments made by the district court from
the bench and in subsequent orders, which revealed the district court's
conviction that there remained vestiges of the unconstitutional dual
system in the KCMSD. 5° Specifically, the district court's order of April
16, 1993, had stated that "there had been a trend of improvement in
140. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755, 760 (8th Cir. 1993),rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
141. See supra note 73.
142. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
143. See Jenkins, 11 F.3d at 760.
144. Jenkins, 1992 WL 551569; see also Jenkins, II F.3d at 760 (noting that district court
rejected State's Freeman arguments "without comment").
145. Jenkins, 1992 WL 551569, at *3.
146. Jenkins, II F.3d 755.
147. Id. at 767.
148. Id. at 768.
149. Id. at 760 ("In granting the funding, it is evident that the district court rejected the State's
arguments.").
150. See id. at 761-63.
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academic achievement, but that the school district was far from reaching
its maximum potential because KCMSD is still at or below national
norms at many grade levels."'' An equally divided Eighth Circuit denied
rehearing en banc.'52
C. The Supreme Court's Decision in Jenkins
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court reversed. 53 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, first addressed the district court's salary
relief order. Invoking the well-settled principle that "the nature of the
desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the
constitutional violation,"'54 he stated that a district court's desegregation
remedy "must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation
itself."'55 The essential question was therefore whether the salary
increases "rest[ed] upon their serving as proper means to the end of
restoring the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they
would have occupied in the absence of that conduct."'56
The starting point for the Court's analysis was its decision in Milliken
v. Bradley (Milliken 1).' In that case, the Court had stated that "without
an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional
wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy." ''  Thus, "[t]he proper
response to an intradistrict violation is an intradistrict remedy that serves
to eliminate the racial identity of the schools within the effected [sic]
school district by eliminating, as far as practicable, the vestiges of dejure
segregation in all facets of their operations."' 59 In Jenkins, the district
court had explicitly found that there had been no interdistrict violation
when it dismissed the surrounding suburban school districts, so the
appropriate remedy was "to eliminate to the extent practicable the
vestiges of prior dejure segregation within the KCMSD: a system-wide
reduction in student achievement and the existence of 25 racially
151. Id. at 761-62.
152. Jenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1994) (denial of rehearing en banc), rev'd, 115 S.
Ct. 2038 (1995).
153. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2056 (1995).
154. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,280 (1977) (Milliken 11).
155. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2049 (quoting Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 282).
156. Id.
157. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
158. Id. at 745.
159. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2050 (citations omitted).
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identifiable schools with a population of over 90 percent black
students."' 1
60
In the Court's view, the salary assistance order was an illicit
interdistrict remedy that exceeded the limits imposed by Milliken L The
Court reasoned that, because the purpose of the salary relief was to
enhance the KCMSD's "desegregative attractiveness," it was designed to
have interdistrict effects.' 6' That is, by attempting to attract nonminority
students from outside the KCMSD, the challenged order sought to
remedy interdistrict racial imbalances. The Court fiund that this
objective was beyond the district court's remedial power, for it
constituted an interdistrict remedy for a violation confined to a single
school district. 62 "In effect, the District Court has devised a remedy to
accomplish indirectly what it admittedly lacks the remedial authority to
mandate directly: the interdistrict tansfer of students."' 63
The Court also was troubled by the open-endedness of the district
court's pursuit of "desegregative attractiveness" and "suburban
comparability."' 64 While every improvement or increased expenditure in
the KCMSD might theoretically attract a larger nonminority enrollment,
"this rationale is not susceptible to any objective limitation."'' 61 These
justifications permitted the district court "limitless authority" to impose
its own educational policy choices on the KCMSD and the State. 66 Nor
are these rationales susceptible to limits of duration. Even though the
KCMSD currently spends roughly twice as much per student as the
surrounding school districts, the district court has continued to order
more programs and greater expenditures in the name of desegregative
attractiveness. 67 There simply is no definable limit to ascertain when the
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2051 (calling order's "purpose [of] attract[ing] nonminority students from outside the
KCMSD schools" an "interdistrict goal").
162. Id. ("[T]his interdistrict goal is beyond the scope of the intradistrict violation identified by
the District Court.").
163. Id.
164. See id. at 2050, 2054-55.
165. Id. at 2054.
166. Id. ("This case provides numerous examples demonstrating the limitless authority of the
District Court operating under this rationale."); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 76 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (contending that distrct court has used desegregative attractiveness "as the
hook on which to hang numerous policy choices about improving the quality of education in general
within the KCMSD").
167. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2054 (noting that per pupil expenditures exch.ding capital costs in
surrounding suburban districts ranged from $2354 to $5956, whereas KCMSD spent $7665.18 per
student).
626
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KCMSD has become sufficiently "attractive." This, the Court stated,
flouted its well settled principles that the "local autonomy of school
districts is a vital national tradition, and that a district court must strive to
restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system
operating in compliance with the Constitution."'
' 68
The Court's discussion of the partial unitary status issue was more
brief. The Court noted that the district court's failure to explicitly address
the State's Freeman arguments "needlessly complicated" the Court's
review. 69 Thus, like the court of appeals, the Supreme Court turned to
the district court's subsequent order mentioning student achievement to
illuminate the court's decision to deny the State's motion for partial
unitary status.' The Court held that the district court's conclusion that
the KCMSD was not desegregated to the extent practicable "because the
District is still at or below national norms at many grade levels"
constituted error: "[T]his clearly is not the appropriate test to be applied
in deciding whether a previously segregated district has achieved
partially unitary status."'' Student achievement is the result of many
factors, several of which are "beyond the control of the KCMSD and the
State."'72 And "[s]o long as these external factors are not the result of
segregation, they do not figure in the remedial calculus."'73 By basing its
denial of the State's motion on student test scores, the district court had
"unwarrantably postpone[d] the day when the KCMSD will be able to
operate on its own."' 74
IV. SIGNS IN THE REASONING: THE IMPLICIT MESSAGE OF
JENKINS
The Court's decision in Jenkins certainly disappointed proponents of
court-enforced desegregation in Kansas City itself.'75 Although Jenkins
168. Id. (citation omitted).
169. Id. at 2055.
170, See id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at2056.
173, Id.
174. Id.
175. See. e.g., Matt Campbell, Parents Range from Fearful to Hopeful in Assessing Decision,
K.C. Star, June 14, 1995, at Al0; Lynn Horsley, District Feels Bite of Ruling: State Withholds
Funds, but Employees Get Paid, K.C. Star, June 16, 1995, at Al; Lynn Horsley et al., Many Issues
Remain, K.C. Star, June 13, 1995, at Al (reporting disappointment of two KCMSD school board
members and of Mayor of Kansas City, Emmanual Cleaver, who said that Court's decision
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technically reversed only the district court's salary assistance order, it
also called into question most of the school district's other remedial
programs, such as those providing for magnet schools and capital
improvements, as the district court had justified those, too, at least in part
on the rejected goal of desegregative attractiveness. Jenkins therefore
hastened the end of state-funded desegregation remedies in the
KCMSD, 7 6 concluding one of the most extensive effoaS in American
history to improve educational opportunities as a remedy to de jure
segregation.'77
The State of Missouri and the KCMSD together have spent between
$1.2 billion and $1.7 billion on improvements to the school district. 78 In
many respects, the KCMSD is now state-of-the-art; it offers students,
among other things, a 3500 square-foot dust-free diesel mechanics room,
a model United Nations facility wired for language translation, a 2000
square-foot planetarium, and a temperature-controlled art gallery.'79 But
the State has borne most of the costs of these improvements, 8 ° so when
state funding ends, the KCMSD will be unable to maintain these
programs and facilities. The Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins already
has forced the district to scale back some of the compensatory programs
for the 1995-96 school year.' At the same time, student achievement in
"touche[d] on quality of life, residential retention and economic development of Kansas City as a
whole, and so I am very concerned").
176. See supra note 2.
177. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393, 397 (8th Cir. 1994) (denial of rehearing en banc)
(Beam, J., dissenting) ("Some observers have described it as the most ambitious and expensive
remedial program in the history of school desegregation."), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995); Theodore
M. Shaw, Missouri v. Jenkins: Are We Really a Desegregated Society?, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 57, 59
(1992) ("[ln Kansas City we have seen the most extensive and expensive 'desegregation' remedy
ever ordered by any court").
178. Dennis Famey, Fading Dream? Integration Is Faltering in Kansas City Schools as Priorities
Change, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1995, at A l (putting figure at $1.2 billion); Linda Greenhouse, Justices
Say Making State Pay in Desegregation Case Was Error, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1995, at Al
(reporting costs of desegregation plan as $1.5 billion); James S. Kunen, The End of Integration: A
Four-Decade Effort is Being Abandoned as Exhausted Courts and Frustrated Blacks Dust Off the
Concept of "Separate but Equal," Time, Apr. 29, 1996, at 39, 41 (reporting cost .as $1.7 billion).
179. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2044-45 (1995); see also Kunen, supra, note 178, at
41.
180. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2045.
181. For instance, the district has suspended its program of providing free transportation for
students attending KCMSD magnet schools who reside outside the district and has stated that it may
have to charge such students tuition beginning in the 1996-97 school year. Donna McGuire, Schools
See Loss from Suburbs: Desegregation Ruling's Fallout Begins to Settle on the KC Magnet
Program, K.C. Star, Aug. 23, 1995, at Al. As a result, roughly 40% of the 158) suburban students
who had planned to attend KCMSD magnet schools for the 1995-96 school year have withdrawn
from the program. Id.
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the district remains disappointingly low; KCMSD students still rank well
below national norms in test scores for reading and math at most grade
levels.'82 Discouragingly, the Court's decision in Jenkins means that
desegregation remedies will soon end in Kansas City without their
having significantly improved the educational outcomes of KCMSD
students, the central objective of the desegregation project.
Beyond Kansas City, however, the Court's explicit holdings in
Jenkins appear comparatively benign. The decision did not announce
doctrinal principles significantly detrimental to the future of court-
enforced desegregation. First, the relevant harm in Jenkins was a system-
wide reduction in student achievement. The principles announced by the
Court therefore bear most directly on cases involving a similar harm, for
example, Milliken II cases. In the vast majority of school desegregation
cases, however, the relevant harm is continuing racial imbalances in
various facets of the school district's operations, such as faculty or
student assignments.'83 Thus, the future applicability of Jenkins's two
explicit holdings likely will be confined to the minority of school
desegregation cases in which the district court has found a reduction in
student achievement and consequently ordered compensatory programs.
Second, within the category of Milliken HI cases, the Court's holdings
were neither pathbreaking nor surprising. That an interdistrict remedy is
inappropriate in a case involving a purely intradistrict violation has been
well settled for more than twenty years, since the Court decided Milliken
L' Jenkins expands this principle to some degree by characterizing the
district court's salary relief order as an interdistrict remedy, even though
it placed affirmative obligations only on the KCMSD. But no other
federal district court ever has explicitly justified remedial compensatory
educational programs in a desegregation remedy on the ground of
"desegregative attractiveness" or "suburban comparability." Moreover,
the Court's pronouncement that a district court cannot tie a school
district's achievement of unitary status to its students' test scores relative
to national norms, although undecided prior to Jenkins, was predictable
and understandable. The relationship between past discrimination and
152. See, e.g., Famey, supra note 178, at A6 (reporting that "[tlest scores show that Kansas City
students generally meet or exceed national test-score averages in grades kindergarten through three,
begin tailing off in middle school and slip badly in high school").
183. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 480-84 (1992) (discussing racial imbalances in
school district's student assignments, faculty and staff assignments, and quality of education).
184. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (Milliken 1) ("[W]ithout an
interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an
interdistrict remedy.").
HeinOnline  -- 71 Wash. L. Rev. 629 1996
Washington Law Review
current test scores is tenuous and extraordinarily dificult to verify
empirically, and the Court consistently has held that desegregation
remedies must be limited to alleviating conditions more directly and
verifiably traceable to the constitutional violation. 8 To mandate the
continuation of court supervision until student achievement reached
some specified level would hold a school district hostage to a variety of
forces over which it has no control, and the effects of which it lacks the
resources to combat.
But while Jenkins's explicit holdings were relatively unremarkable,
the way the Court reached its decision was not. The reasoning of the
majority opinion contained at least three significant flaws, where the
Court either ignored or misconstrued well established doctrinal
principles. And each of these missteps was crucial to permitting the
Court to reach a holding that substantially undermined the continuation
of desegregation remedies in the KCMSD. Jenkins therefore shows that
the Court is willing to forego doctrinal consistency to achieve the
extrinsic goals of curtailing desegregation remedies and expediting the
return of control over school distr..cts to local officials. As such, Jenkins
reveals first that the Court's approach to desegregation cases has
changed, and second that the Court is unwilling to provide an explicit
rationale for this shift.
A. Conceptualizing "Interdistrict Remedy" Expansively
The first telling aspect of the Court's reasoning in Jenkins was its
construction of the term "interdistrict remedy." The Court rejected the
district court's salary relief order because it exceeded the scope of the
court's remedial authority. 8 6 Salary assistance that aimed in part to
attract nonminority students to the KCMSD constituted an interdistrict
remedy to an intradistrict constitutional violation. 87 A crucial step in the
Court's analysis, then, was to characterize the salary re' ief order as an
interdistrict remedy: Because the salary assistance was "not designed
solely to redistribute the students within the KCMSD in order to
eliminate racially identifiable schools" but instead "to attract
nonminority students from outside the KCMSD," it was an "interdistrict
185. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281-82 (1977) (Milliken I1) ("The well-settled
principle that the nature and scope of the remedy are to be determined by the violation means simply
that federal-court decrees must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation itself.").
186. See supra notes 153-68 and accompanying text.
187. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2052 (1995).
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goal" that was "beyond the scope of the intradistrict violation identified
by the District Court."' 8
But this conceptualization of the challenged order is, at best,
counterintuitive. The order commanded only that the State continue to
assist the school district in funding KCMSD faculty and staff salaries, so
that those salaries would be competitive with those offered by
surrounding school districts. The affirmative obligations imposed by the
order were purely intradistrict; they affected only the salaries of KCMSD
faculty and staff. The only sense in which the order was "interdistrict"
was that it was partly designed to enhance the KCMSD's attractiveness
relative to surrounding schools, and thereby potentially entice some
students attending schools outside the school district to enroll in
KCMSD schools.
The best understanding of the salary relief order is not as an
interdistrict remedy but as an intradistrict remedy with potential
interdistrict effects. As such, it was virtually indistinguishable from any
other compensatory education remedy in a desegregation case. As the
Court acknowledged in the majority opinion in Jenkins, any remedial
program that improves the quality of education in a formerly segregated
district will enhance that school district's attractiveness relative to
surrounding schools.'89 What distinguishes the salary relief order in
Jenkins is only that the district court explicitly justified its imposition in
part on the remedy's ability to have such an interdistrict effect. But this
hardly transforms an otherwise purely intradistrict remedy into an
interdistrict remedy. Moreover, to the extent that the district court did
intend the order to have an interdistrict effect, that effect was so
unintrusive on the autonomy of surrounding school districts as to be de
minimis. The order required nothing of any school district other than the
KCMSD. Any transfer of students into Kansas City schools due to the
educational improvements in the district was purely voluntary.
Whether the salary relief order was an intradistrict or an interdistrict
remedy might have been murkier had the district court explicitly made
the KCMSD's achievement of unitary status contingent on its attraction
of a minimum number of nonminority students from outside the district.
In that case, the remedy would have explicitly required a particular
interdistrict effect-the redistribution of nonminority students between
188. Id. at 2051.
189. Id. at 2054 ("It is certainly theoretically possible that the greater the expenditure per pupil
within the KCMSD, the more likely it is that some unknowable number of nonminority students not
presently attending schools in the KCMSD will choose to enroll in those schools.").
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the KCMSD and the surrounding suburban districts-and mandated that
the compensatory programs remain in place until that effect had
occurred. This would have come closer to blurring the line between an
intradistrict and an interdistrict remedy because it would have more
closely approximated requiring innocent school districts to participate in
an interdistrict transfer of students. But the district court imposed no such
requirement in Jenkins; it merely justified the continuation of salary
assistance in part on the ground that it might induce more nonminority
students to enroll voluntarily in KCMSD schools. It therefore was
virtually indistinguishable from any other Milliken I remedial program.
The curiousness of the Court's conceptualization of the term
"interdistrict remedy" is made more clear by comparing Jenkins's salary
relief order to the interdistrict remedy rejected in Milliken 1, the decision
on which the Court relied exclusively in overturning the order. 90
Milliken I, which involved the Detroit public school system, is the only
other Supreme Court decision in which the interdistrict/intradistrict
distinction affected the case's outcome. As in Jenkins, the district court
had found that the school district and the State of Michigan were liable
for the maintenance of de jure segregation in Detroit's public schools, 9'
but that none of the surrounding suburban districts had contributed to
that segregation.'92 When the district court made its liability finding, the
student population in Detroit schools was roughly sixty-four percent
African-American,'93 while nearly all of the students in the school
districts surrounding Detroit were white.'94 Thus, regardless of how
integrated the schools were within the district, a purely intradistrict
remedy would have left "the entire Detroit public school system racially
identifiable."'95
The district court concluded that the Constitution required the
implementation of a desegregation plan that guaranteed Detroit students,
the victims of intentional discrimination, an integrated education. It
therefore ordered a metropolitan-wide remedy involving fifty-three
190. See id. at 2048-53.
191. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 727 (1974) (Milliken 1).
192. Id. at 721-22.
193. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 586 (E.D. Mich. 1971), afid, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir.
1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). The percenzage had grown to 69.8 by 1973. Wilkinson, supra
note 13, at 219.
194. Drew S. Days III, School Desegregation Law in the 1980"s: Why Isn 't Anybody Laughing,
95 Yale L.J. 1737, 1752 (1986) (book review).
195. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 739 (quoting earlier order of the district court).
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suburban school districts.'96 The plan called for extensive mandatory
busing, sending suburban students to inner-city schools and vice-versa; it
assured that there would be a measure of racial balance in the public
schools of the entire Detroit metropolitan area.'97 And the court mandated
suburban school districts' participation, even though the plaintiffs had
not claimed that any of them had violated the Constitution.'98
The Supreme Court held that the district court's remedy exceeded the
scope of the relevant constitutional violations.'99 The Court stated that
school district "[b]oundary lines may be bridged where there has been a
constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief, but the notion that
school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as a mere
administrative convenience is contrary to the history of public education
in our country."2 ' Particularly troublesome to the Court were the scope
of the remedy, its intrusion on the autonomy of school districts that had
committed no constitutional violations, and its placement of the district
court in the role of administrator of a consolidated, "super" school
district.20' "Entirely apart from the logistical and other serious problems
attending large-scale transportation of students, the consolidation [of the
fifty-four districts] would give rise to an array of other problems in
financing and operating this new school system."2"2 The district court's
plan effectively granted itself legislative authority to resolve the myriad
196. Id. at 733-34.
197. Id. at 733-36; see also Wilkinson, supra note 13, at 221 (noting that, under district court's
desegregation plan in Milliken, "the racial composition of the schools throughout the new district
would supposedly be similar").
198. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 729-30.
199. Id. at 745.
200. Id. at 741.
201. Id. at 741-47.
202. Id. at 743. The Court listed specifically several of the questions raised by the district court's
remedy that it found most troubling:
What would be the status and authority of the present popularly elected school boards? Would
the children of Detroit be within the jurisdiction and operating control of a school board elected
by the parents and residents of other districts? What board or boards would levy taxes for school
operations in these 54 districts constituting the consolidated metropolitan area? What provisions
could be made for assuring substantial equality in tax levies among the 54 districts, if this were
deemed requisite? What provisions would be made for financing? Would the validity of long-
term bonds be jeopardized unless approved by all of the component districts as well as the
State? What body would determine that portion of the curricula now left to the discretion of
local school boards? Who would establish attendance zones, purchase school equipment, locate
and construct new schools, and indeed attend to all the myriad day-to-day decisions that are
necessary to school operations affecting potentially more than three-quarters of a million pupils?
Id.
HeinOnline  -- 71 Wash. L. Rev. 633 1996
Washington Law Review
issues regarding the plan's implementation and implicitly made itself the
superintendent of the new metropolitan-wide school district for the
indefinite future.2"3 Thus, not only did the plan impose substantial costs
on innocent school districts, both financially and in terms of restricted
autonomy, it also gave the district court "a task which few, if any, judges
are qualified to perform and one which would deprive the people of
control of schools through their elected representatives." 2"
The Court clarified its holding in Milliken I two termr; later in Hills v.
Gautreaux."5 In that case, the Court stated that it had found the
interdistrict transfer remedy in Milliken I impermissible "not because it
envisioned relief against a wrongdoer extending beyond the city in which
the violation occurred but because it contemplated a judicial decree
restructuring the operation of local governmental entities that were not
implicated in any constitutional violation."0 6 Specifically, the district
court's consolidation plan "would have eliminated numerous
independent school districts or at least have disp:aced important
powers,"207 even though those authorities "were not implicated in
unconstitutional conduct., 20 8 It was this "substantive impact .. .on
separate and independent school districts" that made the Milliken I
remedy unwarranted.20 9 Consequently, "[n]othing in the Milliken
decision suggest[ed] a per se rule that federal courts lack authority to
order parties found to have violated the Constitution to undertake
remedial efforts beyond the municipal boundaries of the city where the
violation occurred."210
By holding that the salary assistance order in Jenkins was an
interdistrict remedy, the Court misapplied the principles of Milliken L
211
As Gautreaux confirmed, the remedy in Milliken I was "interdistrict"
because it placed significant affirmative obligations on "innocent"
203. Id. at 743-44.
204. Id. at 744.
205. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
206. Id. at 296.
207. Id. at 298 n.14.
208. Id. at 298.
209. Id. at 296.
210. Id. at 298. As Justice Souter contended in his dissent, the Court's holding in Jenkins
effectively overruled Gautreaux. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2C88-91 (1995) (Souter,
J., dissenting). But see id. at 2053-54 (stating that Court's decision did not overrule Gautreaux); id.
at 2057-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same).
211. For a similar criticism, see Rana E. Brubaker, Comment, Missouri v. Jenkins: Widening the
Mistakes of Milliken v. Bradley, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 579,590-96 (1996).
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suburban school systems, usurping much of their legally conferred
authority; it essentially abolished the boundaries of fifty-four school
districts.2" By contrast, the salary assistance order in Jenkins imposed no
affirmative obligations on any school district other than the one in which
the violation occurred, and it did not encroach on any other school
system's autonomy." ' The only sense in which the salary relief order
was interdistrict was that it was partly designed to induce some purely
voluntary interdistrict effects. The Court's conceptualization of the term
"interdistrict remedy" in Jenkins ignored this distinction. It simply
equated any contemplated interdistrict effects with an interdistrict
remedy.
The Court stated in Jenkins that "[n]othing in Milliken I suggests that
the District Court in that case could have circumvented the limits on its
remedial authority by requiring the State . . . to implement a magnet
program designed to achieve the same interdistrict transfer of students
that we held was beyond its remedial authority."2 4 But this statement of
the issue turns the appropriate inquiry on its head. More relevant is that
nothing in Milliken I indicated that a remedy having such indirect and
unintrusive interdistrict effects as the salary relief order should be
considered an interdistrict remedy. And left with no guidance from the
Court's previous decisions, the most straightforward and logical
understanding of the order is as an intradistrict remedy intended to have
some interdistrict impact. Nonetheless, the Court made no effort to
wrestle with this conceptual issue. Instead, it broadly expanded the term
212. See Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition, supra note 47, at 780 (contending that "[t]he point of
Milliken I 'is not that a within-Detroit remedy would fully eliminate effects of the violation, but
rather that an interdistrict remedy that would clearly have been more effective was thought to impose
costs that were too great'--that is, it would excessively interfere with local autonomy") (quoting
Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L.J. 585, 647 (1983) [hereinafter Remedies and
Resistance])).
213. Justice Souter observed in his dissent that the salary relief order was not "an interdistrict
remedy in the sense that Milliken I used the term." Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2087 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Paul Gewirtz has similarly noted that:
[O]rdering an interdistrict transfer plan simply does not infringe on the interests of local
autonomy that were Milliken I's concern. The very individualistic and nonsystemic features of a
choice mechanism which make it somewhat troublesome in terms of vindicating victims' rights
make it untroublesome as a threat to the "local autonomy" values identified in Milliken L
Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition, supra note 47, at 781; see also id. at 780 ("Milliken I reflects the
Court's unease with coercive and disruptive busing-and-consolidation remedies. But an interdistrict
transfer provision, which relies on the voluntary choices of individuals, has an altogether different
character.").
214. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2052.
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"interdistrict remedy" by using it to describe a remedy substantially
different than that rejected in Milliken L
B. Stretching to Hold That the District Court's Goal of
"Desegregative Attractiveness" Was Inappropriate
The second revealing aspect of the Court's opinion in Jenkins is that it
even reached the question of whether the district court's goal of
enhancing the school district's desegregative attractiveness exceeded its
remedial authority. The district court had justified the salary relief order
on two separate grounds, both of which independently supported salary
assistance as an element of the KCMSD's desegregation remedies. One
of the court's justifications was to increase the district's nonminority
enrollment through voluntary interdistrict transfers. The -district court's
other rationale--that salary relief was a necessary component of the
overall program to improve the quality of education in the KCMSD-
was less controversial and almost certainly within the district court's
remedial authority. But the Court ignored this justification and only
addressed the propriety of the "desegregative attractiveness" rationale.
Had the Court first considered the district court's other justification,
current doctrine almost certainly would have mandated that the Court
affirm the order, making any assessment of "desegregative
attractiveness" gratuitous.
The district court issued the specific remedial order challenged by the
State on June 25, 1992.z15 In that order, the court approved the
continuation of salary relief for KCMSD employees, with the relief to be
paid out of the jointly-funded desegregation remedies budget. 26 Salary
assistance for KCMSD faculty and staff originally became a part of the
school district's desegregation plan in September 1987.I' At that time,
the district court found that "the KCMSD has an obligation not only to
eliminate the effects of unlawful segregation but also to insure that there
is no diminution in the quality of its regular academic program.
Therefore, it is essential that the KCMSD have sufficient revenues to
fund an operating budget which can provide quality education, including
high quality faculty. 218 Originally conceived, then, the remedy of salary
215. See Jenkins v. Missouri, II F.3d 755,766 (8th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
216. Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1992 WL 551568, at *9 (W.D. Mo. June 25,
1992), aff'd, 11 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
217. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 410-13 (W.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd in part and revd
in part, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
218. Id. at 410.
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assistance was grounded in the goal of improving the quality of
education in the school district, a justification that was almost certainly
within the scope of the district court's unchallenged authority to remedy
the "system wide reduction in student achievement."2 9
As discussed earlier, the plaintiffs and the KCMSD sought a
continuation of the salary relief in 1992, which the State opposed.22°
After a four-day hearing, the district court approved the continuation of
salary assistance. 22' The court justified its order in part as a means "to
improve the desegregative attractiveness of the KCMSD"; 222 it stated
that, to attract nonminority enrollment and retain its current white
students, "the District must hire and retain high quality teachers,
administrators and staff." 3 But this was not the court's exclusive (or
even its primary) justification for salary relief. To the district court,
salary assistance was necessary for the KCMSD to implement its overall
desegregation plan:
The State's proposal would cause severe harm to the desegregation
effort. It is critical to the success of the desegregation plan that the
employees who carry it out are compensated at or near the relevant
market rates of compensation so that the District can attract and
retain employees with the training and experience necessary to
implement the Court's plan. A salary roll back would result in
excessive employee turnover, a decline in the quality and
commitment of work and an inability of the KCMSD to achieve the
objectives of the desegregation plan.224
The district court therefore concluded that "[l]ogic and empirical data
show that in the absence of desegregation funding for salaries, the
District will not be able to implement its desegregation plan."22
219. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 24 (W.D. Mo. 1985), aff'd as modified, 807 F.2d 657
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987). Plaintiffs sought additional salary increases in
1990. Jenkins, 11 F.3d at 766. The district court held hearings lasting several days, after which the
two parties reached a settlement. Id. The salary increases were to be paid equally by the State and the
KCMSD, with the settlement specifically providing that joint and several liability did not apply. Id.
220. Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1992 WL 551569, at *1 (W.D. Mo. June 17,
1992), affd, II F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
221. Id. at *9.
222. Id. at *8.
223. Id.
224. Id. at *9; see also id. at *7 ("There is no question but that a salary roll back would have
effects that would drastically impair implementation of the desegregation remedy.").
225. Id. at *6.
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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order, reiterating that
the district court had found that "high quality personnel are necessary...
to implement specialized desegregation programs intended to improve
educational opportunities" and "to ensure that there is no diminution in
the quality of its regular education programs." '226 The court of appeals
acknowledged that one of the order's goals was to "regain some portion
of the white students who have fled the District and retain those that are
still there. 227 But the court also emphasized that the salary relief was
designed "to improve the educational lot of the victims of
unconstitutional segregation" and to "compensat[e] the victims" of the de
jure segregation in the KCMSD.228
As the case came to the Supreme Court, then, the question for review
was broader than merely the propriety of the district court's goal of
enhancing the school district's desegregative attractiveness. Precisely,
the issue was whether either of the two justifications articulated by the
district court were sufficient to sustain the salary relief order.29
Addressing only the district court's desegregative attractiveness rationale
was insufficient to answer this question, for if either justification
supported the order, the Court was obligated to affirm. And because the
goal of improving the KCMSD's quality of education almost certainly
justified the salary relief order, any discussion about the goal of
desegregative attractiveness should have been unnecessary to the
disposition of the issue. By limiting its analysis to whether the district
court had exceeded its authority in pursuing the goal of desegregative
attractiveness, 230 the Court essentially ignored its well settled rule of
resolving only those questions necessary to the disposition of the case. 3 '
226. Jenkins v. Missouri, I 1 F.3d 755, 766 (8th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
227. Id. at 767.
228. Id.
229. As phrased in the State's petition for certiorari, the question presented wa; whether the order
"directly address[ed] and relate[ed] to the constitutional violation and [was] tailored to cure the
condition that offends the Constitution." See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2076 (1995)
(Souter, J., dissenting). Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in the majority opinion that the Court
had "granted certiorari to consider ... whether the District Court exceeded its constitutional
authority when it granted salary increases to virtually all instructional and noninstructional
employees of the KCMSD." Id. at 2046.
230. This is most evident in the two sentences composing the concluding paragraph of the Court's
analysis of the salary relief order. In the first sentence, the Court stated that the district court's effort
to promote desegregative attractiveness "results in so many imponderables and is so far removed
from the task of eliminating the racial identifiability of the schools within the KCMSD that we
believe it is beyond the admittedly broad discretion of the District Court." Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at
2055. In the next sentence, the Court jumped to invalidating the salary assistance order without any
reference to the district court's additional justification: "In this posture, we concl de that the District
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The Court's sidestepping of this rule of self-restraint is
understandable, as it enabled the Court to speak much more broadly
about the propriety of desegregation remedies in the KCMSD. Salary
relief was only one of several compensatory desegregation programs that
the district court had justified at least in part on the ground of enhancing
the school district's desegregative attractiveness. 2 The district court had
also invoked this rationale to support some of the largest aspects of the
overall desegregation remedy, including the magnet schools program233
and capital improvements in the district.234 Thus, even though the salary
relief order was the only aspect of the desegregation remedy before the
Court, the decision in Jenkins effectively called into question almost all
of the compensatory educational programs in the KCMSD. And the
Court clearly was aware of these ancillary consequences. It expressly
referred to these other programs-and how the district court had justified
them on the ground of desegregative attractiveness-in the majority
opinion.235
Court's order of salary increases, which was grounded in remedying the vestiges of segregation by
improving the desegregative attractiveness of the KCMSD, is simply too far removed from an
acceptable implementation of a permissible means to remedy previous legally mandated
segregation." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 305 (1982) (stating Court's "settled policy to avoid
unnecessary decisions of constitutional issues"); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S.
283, 294 (1982) (recognizing "Court's policy of avoiding the unnecessary adjudication of federal
constitutional questions"); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 734 (1978) (noting that it is
Court's "settled practice to avoid the unnecessary decision of [constitutional questions]"); Kremens
v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 136 (1977) (recognizing Court's "long-established rule" not to "'formulate
a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied"')
(quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885));
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 635-36 (1961) (Warren, C.J., concurring) ("It has not been
the custom of the Court, in deciding the cases which come before it, to write lengthy and abstract
dissertations upon questions which are neither presented by the record nor necessary to a proper
disposition of the issues raised."). As the Court itself has recognized, "this self-imposed limitation on
the exercise of [the] Court's jurisdiction has an importance to the institution that transcends the
significance of particular controversies." City of Mesquite, 455 U.S. at 294.
232. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 26-41 (W.D. Mo. 1985), affd as modified, 807
F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987).
233. See id. at 34-35 (ordering KCMSD to "conduct extensive surveys within the KCMSD and
throughout the Kansas City, Missouri metropolitan area in order to determine what magnet themes
appear to be most likely to attract non-minority enrollment").
234. Id. at 40 ("The improvement of school facilities is an important factor in the overall success
of this desegregation plan. Specifically, a school facility which presents safety and health hazards to
its students and faculty serves both as an obstacle to education as well as to maintaining and
attracting nonminority enrollment.").
235. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2043-44 (1995). In fact, Justice O'Connor noted in her
concurrence that other remedial programs ordered by the district court "may also be improper to the
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Obviously, as the final arbiter of federal law, the Supreme Court must
sometimes go beyond the precise issues presented by a case to make
broader statements about an unsettled area of law. And in any given case,
whether a particular question is properly before the Court can be
uncertain. But to reject a district court's remedial order without having
addressed one of only two of its justifications seems to be a clear breach
of the Court's duty to review only those aspects of a lower court's
decision necessary to affirm or reverse the judgment, particularly when
that second justification was almost certainly within the district court's
remedial authority.
C. Rejecting the District Court's Factual Finding Regarding White
Flight from the KCMSD
A third telling facet of the Court's decision in Jenkins is that it
overturned a nine-year-old factual finding by the district court. A critical
step to the Court's analysis was to show that the relevant constitutional
violations had not caused any interdistrict effects. The Court could not
have held that the district court's order requiring further salary assistance
was a constitutionally unwarranted interdistrict remedy if de jure
segregation in the KCMSD had in fact led to such effecs.236 Milliken I
expressly empowered district courts to impose interdistrict remedies
where the "racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school
districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of
interdistrict segregation." '237 Indeed, in several cases subsequent to
Milliken I federal courts have approved interdistrict remedies due to the
existence of such interdistrict segregative effects.23 So if segregation
extent that they serve the same goals of desegregative attractiveness and suburban comparability."
Id. at 2061 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
236. See id. at 2060 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[W]here a purely intradistrict violation has
caused a significant interdistrict segregative effect, certain interdistrict remedies may be
appropriate.").
237. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (Milliken 1).
238. See, e.g., Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1,778 F.2d 404 (8th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986); Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir.)
(approving consent decree that contained interdistrict transfer provision), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816
(1984); United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1104 (7th Cir.) (approving
interdistrict student assignment plan in Indianapolis because district court found that "official action,
taken with a discriminatory purpose, was a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation"), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Morrilton Sch. Dist. No. 32 v. United States, 605 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980); United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1975);
Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 510 F. Supp. 615, 619 (W.D. Pa.) (holding that inteidistrict remedy was
appropriate because "racially discriminatory acts of the state ha[d] been a substantial cause of
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within the KCMSD had caused nonminority students to leave Kansas
City schools and enroll in private schools or surrounding suburban
districts, there would have existed sufficient interdistrict segregative
effects to justify an interdistrict remedy.
But the Court faced a serious obstacle to this line of reasoning: The
district court had in fact determined that segregation in the KCMSD had
caused white students to leave Kansas City schools, and the court of
appeals had affirmed this conclusion on several occasions. The Court
traditionally affords a district court's factual determinations broad
deference, particularly when concurred in by a court of appeals, and even
more particularly in school desegregation cases.2 9 But the Court showed
no such deference in Jenkins. Indeed, its rejection of the district court's
factual finding was rather cursory, dismissing it as "inconsistent
internally" and "inconsistent with the typical supposition" that white
flight results from desegregation rather than de jure segregation.240 This
aspect of Jenkins was extraordinary: It overturned a nine-year-old factual
finding concurred in by two lower courts, it offered questionable reasons
for doing so, and it directly contradicted the reasoning of an opinion
signed by four members of the Jenkins majority just three months earlier.
1. The District Court's Finding Regarding White Flight and the
Appropriate Standard of Review
The district court identified the primary harm caused by de jure
segregation in the KCMSD as a system-wide reduction in student
achievement.24" ' But the court also found that segregation in Kansas City
schools, while limited to only that school district, had "led to white flight
from the KCMSD to suburban districts [and] large numbers of students
leaving the schools of Kansas City and attending private schools."242 The
Eighth Circuit affirmed this factual determination on at least three
interdistrict segregation"), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963 (1981); Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. 982
(D. Del.), affd, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980). But cf. Days, supra
note 194, at 1753 (contending that, after Milliken I, interdistrict remedies are likely possible only in
school districts in southern and border states, where de jure segregation was pervasive and cut across
district lines).
239. See infra notes 248-76 and accompanying text.
240. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2052.
241. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
242. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2084 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d
1295, 1302 (8th Cir. 1988)).
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separate occasions." In fact, in its 1993 decision ultimately reversed by
the Supreme Court in Jenkins, the court of appeals indicated that the
State might have waived any claim of error regarding the district court's
conclusion regarding white flight.2" Even those Eighth Circuit judges
who believed that the district court's salary relief order was
constitutionally unwarranted concurred in the court's in the white flight
finding.245 And the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Jenkins
243. In August 1988, on direct appeal from the district court's initial remedial order, the court of
appeals expressly approved the district court's conclusion that segregation in the KCMSD had
"caused it to lose significant numbers of its white students and that regaining those students [was] a
necessary part of restoring the victims to the condition they would have enjoyed had there been no
constitutional violation." Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 19118), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). The court of appeals also noted that "the preponderance of black
students in the district was due to the State and KCMSD's constitutional violations," and that "the
existence of segregated schools led to white flight from the KCMSD to suburban districts and to
private schools." Id. at 1302.
Three years later, in August 1991, the Eighth Circuit again approved the district court's factual
determination concerning white flight. Jenkins v. Missouri, 942 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 967 (1991). The State had appealed a district court order approving a contingency
plan that had modified the KCMSD's admissions policy for its magnet schools. Id. at 488. The
district court's white flight finding was material to the dispute because, like the salary relief order,
the court had approved the magnet school program partly for purposes of "establishing an
environment designed to maintain and attract non-minority enrollment." Jenkin. , 855 F.2d at 1301-
02. Addressing the State's argument against the magnet school admissions order, the court of appeals
reiterated that it had previously "pointed to district court findings ... that segregation in KCMSD
had caused the departure of whites in the system to private and suburban school;." Jenkins, 942 F.2d
at 491. The court of appeals accordingly affirmed the district court's order, ccncluding that it saw
"no abuse of discretion in the orders entered in this case, no legal error, and insofar as the findings
are based upon findings of fact, no findings of fact that are clearly erroneous." Ik at 492.
Finally, in its 1993 decision subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court, the court of appeals
again affirmed the white flight finding. Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755, 768 (th Cir. 1993), rev'd,
115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995). It restated that the vestiges of the unconstitutional dual school system
identified by the district court were "reduced student achievement and white flight, resulting in the
anomaly of a racially isolated school district in the midst of a population with a far different racial
makeup." Id. at 764. On these grounds, the district court had approved continued salary assistance
both "to improve the educational lot of the victims of unconstitutional segregation" and "to regain
some portion of the white students who have fled the District." Id. at 767. The Eighth Circuit
concluded that "[t]here was substantial evidence to support the district court's findings." Id. at 768.
244. Specifically, the court stated that the State had made "no claim that the findings of fact of the
district court are clearly erroneous." Jenkins, II F.3d at 767.
245. After a three-judge panel affirmed the salary assistance order in 1993, an equally divided en
banc Eighth Circuit denied rehearing of the State's challenge. Jenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393 (8th
Cir. 1994) (denial of rehearing en banc), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995). Judge Beam, joined by the
four other judges, dissented from the denial of rehearing. Id. at 396-404 (Be-am, J., dissenting).
Although Judge Beam contended that the salary order should have been overturned, he nonetheless
cited the district court's white flight determination with approval: "'White flight' [from the KCMSD]
to private schools and to the suburbs was rampant," and "[tihe district courtj] correctly recogniz[ed]
that at least part of this problem was the consequence of the de jure segregation previously practiced
under Missouri constitutional and statutory law." Id. at 397.
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expressly acknowledged that the district court had made this finding,24 6
as did Justice Thomas in his concurrence. 47
Because of trial courts' superior position for assessing the credibility
of witnesses and for weighing evidence, their findings of fact come to
appellate courts with a presumption of correctness.2 48 Rule 52(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that an appellate court can disturb
a district court's factual conclusion only if it is "clearly erroneous. 249
Rarely will a federal court of appeals, let alone the Supreme Court, find
such error.250 In addition, the Supreme Court traditionally affords even
greater deference to factual determinations concurred in by two lower
courts. The Court has referred to this practice as the "two court rule,"
under which the Court "ordinarily" will not review factual findings made
by a district court and approved by the court of appeals.sl Appellants
246. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2052 (recognizing "the District Court's statement that segregation has
'led to white flight from the KCMSD to suburban districts').
247. Id. at 2063 (Thomas, J., concurring) (acknowledging that "the District Court indicated that
post-1954 'white flight' was another vestige of the pre-1954 segregated system").
248. See Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 856 (1982).
249. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."); see also Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295,
1300 (8th Cir. 1988) ("We have also recognized the importance of the district court's factual
findings, which may not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
250. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the "clearly erroneous" standard is quite deferential.
It means that an appellate court cannot disturb a district court's factual determination unless the court
"is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). That is, "[if the district court's account of the
evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the [appellate court] may not
reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed
the evidence differently." Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985); see also
Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 223 (1988) (quoting same). Where "there are two permissible views
of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous." Anderson, 470
U.S. at 574.
251. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 275 (1985). The
two court rule is a norm of self-restraint created by the Court itself to manage its own procedure.
Monaghan, supra, at 275. And although the Court's invocation of the two court rule has been
intermittent and its statements about its exact content somewhat vague, see Kevin M. Clermont,
Procedure's Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 Cornell L.
Rev. I115, 1132 (1987), the rule has maintained its vitality. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2084 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (describing two court rule as an "accepted norm of [the Court's] appellate
procedure"). For instance, the Court stated as recently as 1984 that its "usual practice" is to "accord
great weight to a finding of fact which has been made by a district court and approved by a court of
appeals." NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 n.15 (1984). And the Court stated four years
earlier in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), that it is the Court's "settled practice [to] acceptf],
absent the most exceptional circumstances, factual determinations in which the district court and the
court of appeals have concurred." Id. at 512 n.6; see also Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v. United States,
469 U.S. 310, 317 n.5 (1985) (stating that Court "has frequently noted its reluctance to disturb
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must show that there exists some "extraordinary reason" to revisit the
factual conclusion,25 or that the case presents "the most exceptional
circumstances, 253 where there is "a very obvious and exceptional
showing of error.'
254
findings of fact concurred in by two lower courts") (quoting Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623
(1982)); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 614 (1984) (explaining that "[t]radi:ionally [the Court]
ha[s] been reluctant to disturb findings of fact in which two courts below have concurred").
Reasons of institutional mission and division of labor between the three tiers of the federal courts
counsel the Supreme Court to be even more reluctant than a court of appeals to reject a district
court's factual finding. The purpose of the Supreme Court, at least under the modem regime of
discretionary review, is to decide annually close to one hundred of the most pressing legal
controversies of the day. It emphatically is not to micromanage the factual delerminations of the
hundreds of federal district courts. In contrast, the courts of appeal have no discretion in the cases
that they review. They therefore review every appeal claiming that a district court's finding of fact
was clearly erroneous.
When a court of appeals throws out an erroneous factual finding, it is fulfilli ig its mission as a
backstop to review all alleged errors by a district court. But when the Supreme Court decides that a
district court's factual finding was clearly erroneous, it expends scarce resources to decide issues
with no precedential value. Moreover, if it comes to the Supreme Court after having been affirmed
by the court of appeals, that finding has an additional guarantee of trustworthiness. The dissent
raised these precise points in Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1576-78 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), an opinion signed by four of the justices in the Jenkins majority. See infra notes 255-63
and accompanying text.
252. In Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 665 (1987), the Court stated that:
The Court of Appeals did not set aside any of the District Court's findings of fact that are
relevant to this case. That is the way the case comes to us, and both courts below having agreed
on the facts, we are not inclined to examine the record for ourselves absent some extraordinary
reason for undertaking this task.
Id.
253. Branti, 445 U.S. at 512 n.6.
254. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949), af'd in part on
rehearing, 339 U.S. 605 (1950). In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist, author of tle majority opinion
in Jenkins, has endorsed the two court rule on at least two occasions during his tenure on the Court.
In United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), then-Justice Rehnquist invoked the Court's
"traditional deference to the 'two court rule' in upholding a district court's factual determination
that government investigators would have inevitably discovered certain evidence found during an
illegal search. Id. at 273. And in an important school desegregation case in 197,1, Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), he chastised the Court in his dissenting opinion for effectively
circumventing the rule. As in Jenkins, a central question in Keyes concerned the causal relation
between segregation in one area of the city and racial imbalances in schools across town, only in
Keyes the respective schools were part of the same school district. Id. at 207-13. The Court held that,
in all cases of de jure segregation, racial imbalances within a school district's boundaries are
presumptively related to the constitutional violation; the Court therefore remanded the case to the
district court for further factual findings. Id. at 210, 213-14. Justice Rehnquist contended that the
majority had chosen to remand the case, instead of reversing, because of the obstacle of the two
court rule: "[I]t would be contrary to settled principles for this Court to upse: a factual finding
sustained by the Court of Appeals. 'A seasoned and wise rule of this Court makes concurrent
findings of two courts below final here in the absence of very exceptional showing of error."' Id. at
HeinOnline  -- 71 Wash. L. Rev. 644 1996
Missouri v. Jenkins
Four justices in the Jenkins majority emphasized these grounds for
deferring to trial courts' factual findings in a dissenting opinion filed
only three months before Jenkins. In Kyles v. Whitley,2" the Court
granted a prisoner's petition for habeas corpus, ruling that the court of
appeals had misapplied Brady v. Maryland256 by failing to assess the
cumulative value of evidence withheld by the state. 7 Justice Scalia,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas,
wrote a scathing dissent, in which he castigated the majority for
revisiting a largely factual claim." 8 He wrote that the majority
"opinion-which considers a fact-bound claim of error rejected by every
court ... that previously heard it-is, so far as I can tell, wholly
unprecedented., 25 9 The only issue in Kyles, he contended, was whether
the lower courts had misapplied the proper legal standard to the facts, an
essentially factual determination. 260 Not only does the Court generally
not review factual findings, but it applies its policy of deference to such
determinations "with particular rigor when [the] district court and court
of appeals are in agreement as to what conclusion the record requires. 261
According to the dissent, the majority had breached a well established
rule of self-restraint and ventured beyond its institutional competence in
ignoring the two court rule.26 2 "The reality is that responsibility for
factual accuracy, in capital cases as in other cases, rests elsewhere-with
trial judges and juries, state appellate courts, and the lower federal
courts; we do nothing but encourage foolish reliance to pretend
othervise. '263
In addition, the Supreme Court previously has given special weight to
the factual determinations of district courts in school desegregation
cases. Consider, for instance, the dispute between the majority and the
dissent in Columbus Board of Education v. Penick." The district court
had found that the public schools in Columbus, Ohio, were unlawfully
264 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211,
214 (1948)).
255. 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995).
256. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
257. Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1567-69.
258. See id. at 1576-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 1576.
260. See id. at 1576-77.
261. Id. at 1577.
262. See id.
263. Id.
264. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
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segregated prior to 1954, and that the school board had not fulfilled its
constitutional obligation to disestablish the dual system.26 The Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's judgment, but two dissenting justices
would have rejected the district court's conclusion that existing
segregation in Columbus schools was traceable tc intentional
discrimination.26 6 In rejoinder, the Court emphasized the importance of
deferring to district courts on such issues: "[O]n the issue of whether
there was a dual system in Columbus, Ohio, in 1954, cn the record
before us we are much more impressed by the views of the judges who
have lived with the case over the years." '267 The Court stated that the
dissent's "suggestion that this Court should play a special oversight role
in reviewing the factual determinations of the lower courts in school
segregation cases asserts an omnipotence and omniscience that we do not
have and should not claim." '268 Moreover, in Dayton Board of Education
v. Brinkman (Dayton Jl),269 decided the same day as Columbus, the Court
similarly recognized that, in the context of desegregation cases, "there is
great value in appellate courts showing deference to the fact-finding of
,,211local trial judges.
Justice Stewart's separate opinions in Columbus and Dayton I,
frequently cited by lower federal courts, 271' express the same idea more
forcefully. Justice Stewart wrote that "[t]he development: of the law
concerning school segregation has not reduced the need for sound
factfinding by the district courts, nor lessened the appropriateness of
265. Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 260 (S.D. Ohio 1977), affd, 583 F.2d
787 (6th Cir. 1978), affd in part, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
266. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 489-525 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 457 n.6.
268. Id. (citation omitted).
269. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
270. Id. at 534 n.8.
271. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 895 F.2d 659, 667 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1082 (1991); Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 911 (10th Cir. 1989) (Baldock, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 503 U.S. 978 (1992); Diaz v. San Jose Unified Seh. Dist., 861 F.2d 591, 595
(9th Cir. 1988); Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 331 (1st Cir. 1987); Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d
657, 667 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County
Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 411 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186
(1986); Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 733 F.2d 660, 675 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Choy, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985); Alexander v. Youngstown Bd. of Educ., 675 F.2d
787, 796 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 637 F.2d I101, 1118 n.7 (7th
Cir.) (Tone, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Reed v. Rhodes, 7.1 F. Supp. 1295,
1296 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Reed v. Rhodes, 500 F. Supp. 363, 367 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 635 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1980).
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deference to their findings of fact."272 Appellate review of district court
judgments in desegregation cases calls for "undiminished deference to
the factual adjudications of the federal trial judges... uniquely situated
as those judges are to appraise the societal forces at work in the
communities where they sit." 73 Determinations concerning intricate
causal relationships, such as those between school segregation and
demographic changes, are challenging enough for a trial court, which has
the benefit of hearing live testimony. "The coldness and impersonality of
a printed record, containing the only evidence available to an appellate
court in any case, can hardly make the answers any clearer." '274 Justice
Stewart therefore concluded that in desegregation cases, "appellate courts
should accept even more readily than in most cases the factual findings
of the courts of first instance."275 Circuit courts subsequently have taken
these pronouncements as establishing a rule of special deference to
factual findings in school desegregation cases. 6
2. The Court's Questionable Reasoning
Thus, as Jenkins came to the Supreme Court, there were at least three
distinct reasons for the Court to afford extreme deference to the district
court's conclusion that intradistrict segregation within the KCMSD had
272. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 470 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in Dayton,
443 U.S. 526).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 471.
275. Id.
276. Cf The Supreme Court. 1991 Term--Leading Cases, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 163, 258 (1992)
[hereinafter The Supreme Court. 1991 Term] (noting that, in school desegregation cases, "appellate
courts have ... deferred to district court factual findings .... and some have suggested that appellate
courts should be more hesitant than usual in upsetting district court determinations"). For instance,
the Fourth Circuit has acknowledged that "[tihe Supreme Court has said that appellate courts should
give great deference to the district court's findings in school desegregation cases," Goldsboro City
Bd. of Educ. v. Wayne County Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 324, 327 (4th Cir. 1984), and held that
"[flactual findings by a district court in school desegregation cases, especially where the presiding
judge has lived with the case for many years, are entitled to great deference on review," Riddick v.
School Bd.. 784 F.2d 521, 533 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986). The Sixth Circuit
likewise has recognized "'the crucial role of the federal district courts in school desegregation
cases,"' stating that the "argument in support of even greater deference to [factual] findings" in such
cases is "persuasive." Alexander v. Youngstown Bd. of Educ., 675 F.2d 787, 796 (6th Cir. 1982)
(quoting Columbus, 443 U.S. at 469 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in Dayton,
443 U.S. 526)). And in Jenkins itself, the Eighth Circuit noted that "'[t]he Supreme Court has
emphasized the importance of the clearly erroneous rule in civil rights cases and, more particularly,
in school desegregation cases."' Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 666-67 (8th Cir. 1986) (citation
omitted) (quoting Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski City Special Sch. Dist., 778 F.2d 404, 411 (8th
Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987).
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caused white students to leave the district-Rule 52(a), the two court
rule, and the tradition of special deference to factual findings in
desegregation cases. Under these circumstances, one would have
expected the Court to provide substantial justification for its decision to
overrule the district court's factual determination. But the Court's
opinion in Jenkins contained no serious weighing of the record. Instead,
it rejected the district court's finding because of its counterintuitiveness
and its supposed inconsistency with the district court's earlier finding
that none of the suburban school districts had unlawfully discriminated:
"The lower courts' 'findings' as to 'white flight' are bolh inconsistent
internally, and inconsistent with the typical supposition, bolstered here
by the record evidence, that 'white flight' may result from desegregation,
not de jure segregation." '277 The Court made no effort in its opinion to
discern what had led the district court to its conclusion. Indeed, Jenkins
contains no discussion of what actually happened in KCMSD-what the
demographic makeup of the district was in 1954, how and when it
changed, or why the district court's conclusion was implausible.
Particularly noteworthy was the Court's failure at any point in the
opinion to articulate the appropriate standard of review. Jenkins contains
no reference to Rule 52(a); the phrases "clear error" and "clearly
erroneous" do not appear in the opinion. Thus, the Court never attempted
to explain why the district court's white flight finding was implausible or
impermissible in light of the record viewed as a whole. Nor did the Court
ever mention the two court rule or its traditional deference to trial court's
factual findings in school desegregation cases. Consequently, the Court
made no attempt to explain what "extraordinary reason" justified
277. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2052 (1995) (footnote omitted). According to the
Court, the finding was internally inconsistent because the district court, when dismissing the
suburban school districts, had held that "this case involved no interdistrict con:;titutional violation
that would support interdistrict relief." Id. at 2050. But the district court had made this finding as
part of its holding that a mandatory interdistrict remedy akin to that condemned in Milliken I was
inappropriate. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Mo. 1984). The district court
specifically had found that "Plaintiffs simply failed to show that those defendants had acted in a
racially discriminatory manner that substantially caused racial segregation in another district." Id. at
1488. Thus, read in context, the district court's finding most likely meant tiat there were not
sufficient interdistrict segregative effects--or discriminatory acts by suburban districts--to justify a
mandatory interdistrict transfer plan. Moreover, to the extent that the district court's statement about
interdistrict effects referred to by the Court was unclear, its subsequent (and more specific) white
flight finding resolved this ambiguity. By stating that dejure segregation in the KCMSD had caused
nonminority students to leave the school district, the district court was necessarily saying that there
had been some interdistrict effects. Reading the two rulings together, the first stitement is properly
understood as concluding that there were not sufficient interdistrict effects to justify a mandatory
multi-district remedy.
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revisiting this factual issue or what in Jenkins convinced the Court that
there was "a very obvious and exceptional showing of error."
Nor did the majority make any attempt to explain why the arguments
posed by the dissent in Kyles did not apply with equal force in Jenkins.
As in Kyles, the district court and the court of appeals in Jenkins had
both correctly stated the substantive law, namely that an interdistrict
remedy was inappropriate in a case involving only intradistrict
segregation.278 And both lower courts had correctly stated that the scope
of the constitutional violation determines the scope of the remedy, so that
all remedial orders must be tailored to address only the lingering effects
of unlawful segregation.279 The sole contested issue about the salary
relief order was whether the district court and the court of appeals had
correctly applied these legal principles to the facts of the case. And this,
in turn, depended entirely on whether segregation within the KCMSD
had caused interdistrict segregative effects, a purely factual
determination.
Also significant is the Court's statement in Jenkins that the "typical
supposition.-"that 'white flight' may result from desegregation, not de
jure segregation"--was "bolstered here by record evidence."2 ' This
statement reveals a twofold misunderstanding of the proper question for
review. First, the issue was not whether the desegregation of the
KCMSD caused nonminority students to leave the district, but whether
de jure segregation had had this effect; conceivably both contributed to
white flight from the school district. Second, when an appellate court
reviews any factual finding, the question is never whether the record
supports a different conclusion. Rather, the issue is whether the record
fails to support the finding under review. Thus, the appropriate question
in Jenkins was whether the record lacked support for the district court's
278. Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 662 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc) ("Without an interdistrict
violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong requiring an interdistrict remedy."),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987); Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1488 (W.D. Mo. 1984)
(citing Milliken I and stating that plaintiffs could not obtain interdistrict relief because they failed to
show that suburban school districts "had acted in a racially discriminatory manner that substantially
caused racial segregation in another district").
279. Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1299 (8th Cir. 1988) ("'[T]he nature of the
desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation."')
(quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (Milliken 11)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034
(1989); Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 23 (W.D. Mo. 1985) ("The basic remedial principle,
repeatedly articulated by the courts in school desegregation cases, is that 'the scope of the remedy is
determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation."') (quoting Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974) (Milliken 1)), aff'd as modified, 807 F.2d 657 (Sth Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 816 (1987).
280. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2052.
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conclusion that de jure segregation had caused white flight. That the
record "bolstered" a conclusion that desegregation caused white flight
was immaterial.
More fundamentally, the Court premised its analysis on a tenuous
dichotomy between the effects cf segregation and desegregation.
Arguably, any consequence of the desegregation process, such as white
flight, is also causally related to the de jure violation, for there would
never have been desegregation of the school district had there not first
been segregation.28' The effects of the former are largely
indistinguishable from the effects of the latter. At the same time, a
regime of state-imposed segregation likely influences conditions and
attitudes that directly lead to whites leaving the school system when the
de jure system is dismantled. "Whites who flee are often seeking to avoid
conditions that the government's de jure segregation helped to create,
and to replicate racial patterns to which the government's own de jure
segregation has accustomed them." '282 Thus, even if the Court was correct
that nonminority students left the KCMSD in response to the process of
desegregation, this hardly diminishes the correctness of the district
court's conclusion that white flight was a result of de jure segregation
within the KCMSD.
Moreover, even accepting the Court's logic on its own terms, its
statement about "the typical supposition" may itself be empirically
suspect.283 Admittedly, substantial social science research supports the
thesis that court-enforced desegregation, especially when accomplished
through mandatory busing or student reassignment, leads to a decline in
white enrollment in the desegregated school district.": 4 But the
281. Id. at 2085 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that "there is in fact no break in the chain of
causation linking the effects of desegregation with those of segregation. There would be no
desegregation orders and no remedial plans without prior unconstitutional segregation as the
occasion for issuing and adopting them, and an adverse reaction to a desegregation order is traceable
in fact to the segregation that is subject to the remedy."); Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, supra
note 212, at 640 ("White flight itself is an effect of the original de jure segregation, and therefore
segregated attendance patterns resulting from flight are an effect of the original violation.").
282. Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, supra ncte 212, at 640.
283. Cf. Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition, supra note 47, at 767 ("Courts cannot simply assume
that [white) flight will be a significant and irreversible problem [for desegregation] in every school
system; the likelihood and extent of flight depends upon the racial composition of the system, the
particular design of the desegregation plan, and a range of setting-specific variables.").
284. See, e.g., Armor, supra note 80, at 180 ("The consensus at this point is that school
desegregation contributes to white flight and that the flight can be quite large for some school
systems, especially those systems that are larger, have higher minority concentrations, and have
suburban or private school systems that can serve as alternatives for those who flee a desegregation
plan or for new residents who want to avoid one."); James S. Coleman et al., Trends in School
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KCMSD's desegregation plan did not include mandatory student
reassignment or busing.285 And a significant body of research has
demonstrated that desegregation remedies have not, in fact, lead to
greater white flight than would have otherwise occurred,286 and in some
cities they have actually stabilized demographic shifts.287 For instance,
Segregation, 1968-1973 (1975) (concluding that court-ordered school desegregation was substantial
cause of declining white enrollment in those school districts); Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance,
supra note 212, at 629 ("While some research has questioned the extent to which flight occurs
because of school desegregation ... it is now widely agreed that school desegregation typically does
accelerate white departures from the public school system above the 'normal' loss."). Mandatory
student reassignment and busing are the factors most associated with white flight. See Armor, supra
note 80, at 176-78; Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, supra note 212, at 629 n. 114; Christine H.
Rossell, The Convergence of Black and White Attitudes on School Desegregation Issues During the
Four Decade Evolution of the Plans, 36 Wim. & Mary L. Rev. 613, 624-27 (1995).
285. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 38 (W.D. Mo. 1985), affd as modified, 807 F.2d
657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987).
286. Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy 100 (1978) (reviewing
relevant research and concluding that "[d]esegregation ... neither creates flight where there was
none nor has a long-term impact on the rate of declining white enrollment"); Finis Welch & Audry
Light, New Evidence on School Desegregation 66-67 (1987) (stating that researchers have
discredited theory that "desegregation efforts might trigger such a large exodus of white students that
racial isolation actually increases"); Philip A. Cusik, The Effects of School Desegregation and Other
Factors on "White Flight" from an Urban Area, 15 Educ. Adm. Q. 35, 48 (1979) (studying
desegregation in Pontiac, Michigan and concluding that whites' attitudes about busing "d[id] not
even indirectly contribute to 'white flight"); Thomas F. Pettigrew & Robert L. Green, School
Desegregation in Large Cities: A Critique of the Coleman "White Flight" Thesis, 46 Harv. Educ.
Rev. 1, 49-53 (1976); Christine H. Rossell, School Desegregation and White Flight, 90 Pol. Sci. Q.
675, 688 (1976) (finding that "school desegregation causes little or no significant white flight, even
when it is court ordered and implemented in large cities.").
287. Willis D. Hawley et al., Strategies for Effective Desegregation: Lessons from Research 63
(1983) (reviewing several studies on relationship between school desegregation and white flight and
concluding that "[t]he right kind of school desegregation plan can slow the process of racial change
and encourage residential desegregation"). Likewise, Liebman states that:
[After the second year of desegregationj white loss normally drops off almost to pre-
desegregation levels and in the case of certain kinds of plans appears to fall below pre-
desegregation levels. Although the data are fragmentary, they create the possibility that, over the
course of a decade or so, certain kinds of desegregation plans actually produce a net gain in the
number of white children attending school in desegregated districts.
Liebman, supra note 19, at 1622; see also George K. Cunningham et al., The Impact of Court-
Ordered Desegregation on Student Enrollment and Residential Patterns (White Flight), 160 J.
Educ., May 1978, at 36, 44 (discussing study of Jefferson County, Kentucky, finding that "[b]ecause
of the stabilizing effect on schools over a wide area, a metropolitan desegregation plan can have a
positive effect by keeping neighborhoods from undergoing rapid changes in ethnic makeup"); Gary
Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan Society, 80 Minn. L. Rev.
825, 831 (1996) (noting that "the most extensive desegregation plans, covering entire urbanized
counties, have shown by far the highest levels of desegregation and have produced the nation's most
stable districts in their percentage of white enrollment"); Christine H. Rossell, The Effect of School
Integration on Community Integration, 160 J. Educ., May 1978, at 46, 59-60 (finding that school
integration can lead to long term reductions in residential segregation).
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studies show that metropolitan-wide desegregation has induced
demographic stabilization in several communities, including Charlotte28
and Raleigh,28 9 North Carolina, and St. Louis, Missouri29C causing more
white students to stay in the district than would have absent
desegregation. It is quite possible that the "typical supposition" was an
inappropriate assumption for Kansas City.
There are certainly plausible explanations for how de jure segregation
within the KCMSD could have caused white flight. For instance, the de
jure system may have attracted more African-American families to move
to Kansas City so that their children could attend the all-black schools.
Black parents might have felt more comfortable sending their children to
these all-black schools, perhaps because they were a reft:ge from overt
discrimination or because they promoted a sense of black community in
their students. And as more black families moved into the KCMSD, more
whites may have left Kansas City for less diverse school districts.
Prejudiced whites might have feared a drop in their property values due
to the increasing concentration of African-Americans, or they might have
felt that the quality of education in the district was declining simply due
to the increasing presence of blacks, albeit in separate schools. Or biased
whites might simply have not wanted to associate with blacks in any
way, and therefore left the KCMSD because it included significant
numbers of African-Americans. Whatever the reason, research has
corroborated that the rate of white flight from school districts accelerates
as the proportion of black enrollment increases, even where the district's
schools remain largely segregated.291
288. See Frye Gaillard, The Dream Long Deferred 155-59 (1988) (describing stabilization of
demographic shifts in Charlotte after metropolitan-wide school desegregation); Orfield, supra note
287; Brief Amici Curiae of the NAACP et al., at 7A, Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (No. 89-
1290) (including statement signed by 52 scientists summarizing research concerning effects of
school desegregation); cf. Denis J. Lord & John C. Catu, School Desegregatio Policy and Intra-
School District Migration, 57 Soc. Sci. Q. 784, 794 (1977) (studying residential movement in
Charlotte in two years immediately after implementation of desegregation remed es and finding that,
although impact of desegregation could not be completely denied, "the temptation to view this as a
cause and effect relationship should be tempered with caution because the stronger suburbanization
trend may actually be indicative of a more active period of intra-urban residential mobility during the
1970s as well as of other factors not associated with school desegregation").
289. Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and School Resegregation, in Gary Orfield et al.,
Dismanteling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of Education 291, 316-17
(1996).
290. H. Schmandt et al., Government, Politics, and the Public Schools: A Preliminary Study of
Three Cities (1977) (cited in Gary Orfield, Research, Politics, and the Antibustng Debate, Law &
Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1978, at 141, 170 n.174).
291. Orfield, supra note 287, at 71.
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Obviously, judgments about the causes of existing conditions in a
formerly segregated school district, and the roles played by de jure
segregation and desegregation, are largely speculative. 92 But because the
Court has made the elimination of all vestiges of the de jure system the
test of constitutional compliance, 93 causation is necessarily the
touchstone for determining whether existing conditions require further
remedy. And the level of complexity and uncertainty in these inquiries, if
anything, weighs in favor of granting greater deference to the trial
court's conclusions. If making such determinations is difficult for a
district court, which has supervised the case directly and heard days (or
even months) of live testimony, it will present a substantially greater
challenge to appellate courts.
D. The Implicit Message of Jenkins
In sum, the reasons offered by the Court for rejecting the district
court's salary relief order were unconvincing. The Court construed the
term "interdistrict remedy" far too broadly and in a manner inconsistent
with its holdings in Milliken I and Gautreaux; it ignored a less
controversial justification for salary assistance that appeared to be clearly
within the district court's remedial authority; and it failed to justify its
rejection of the district court's white flight finding, providing no
explanation as to why the district court's reading of the record was
implausible. These flaws in the Court's analysis make clear that the
outcome in Jenkins was a result of the Court's extrinsic goals. Namely,
the Court sought reasons to end the prolonged and expensive
desegregation remedies ordered by the district court for the KCMSD.
Jenkins reveals an important, albeit unsurprising, change in the
Court's approach to desegregation cases. The Court's implicit analytical
baseline has shifted. No longer does the Court presume that, where
desegregation remedies have been less than totally effective, school
districts must take further measures to ensure the eradication of all
vestiges of the de jure system. Rather, the Court starts from the implicit
premise that, where a school district has implemented its desegregation
plan in good faith, the district court should return control over the school
district to local officials as soon as practicable, even if current conditions
in the school district indicate that vestiges of past discrimination may
292. Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 751,763 (1991).
293. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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remain." The Court no longer vigorously insists, as it once did, that
school systems must eliminate de jure segregation "root and branch. 295
Instead, the Court now emphasizes what it has termed the "ultimate
objective" in desegregation cases: "return[ing] school districts to the
control of local authorities.,
296
Moreover, Jenkins shows that the Court intends to accomplish this
shift without stating so explicitly. The Rehnquist Court, at least to this
point, has been unwilling to alter the doctrinal principles responsible for
the results it now finds disquieting. Instead, as Jenkins illustrates, it
prefers narrow, case-specific reasons for issuing decisions that curtail
desegregation remedies and expedite the end of judicial supervision over
formerly segregated school districts. In short, Jenkins reveals an
important, implicit change in the Court's approach to school segregation
cases-a quiet revolution in desegregation law.
V. PLACING JENKINS IN CONTEXT
The implicit message of Jenkins is more apparent if one views the
decision as the third in a trilogy of important desegregation cases decided
by the Rehnquist Court. In all three cases-Jenkins, Board of Education
v. Dowell297 and Freeman v. Pitts---the Court substantially undermined
the continuation of desegregation remedies, and expedited the end of
judicial supervision, in the respective school districts. The outcomes
were consistent, even if the Court's analysis was not. Moreover, while
the Court did not explicitly question its desegregation remedies
jurisprudence, the rhetoric of the three decisions provided tacit support
for the abandonment of court-ordered desegregation. Each opinion
contained language useful to lower courts for justifying decisions that
end desegregation remedies and return control over formerly de jure
school systems to local officials. Thus, placing Jenkins in the context of
294. Compare Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) ("The burden on a school
board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises
realistically to work now."), with Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 498 (1992) ("A history of good-
faith compliance is evidence that any current raeial imbalance is not the product of a new dejure
violation, and enables the district court to ao'ept the school board's representation that it has
accepted the principle of racial equality and will not suffer intentional discrimination in the future.").
295. Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38 (holding that formerly segregated school districts are "clearly
charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch").
296. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489.
297. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
298. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
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the Court's other recent desegregation decisions further clarifies the
Court's agenda, namely the de facto abandonment of court-enforced
desegregation.
The question in Dowell concerned the obligation of a school district,
after having been declared unitary but not fully released from judicial
supervision, to comply with the requirements of the district court's
desegregation decree. Oklahoma City had used mandatory busing to
desegregate its public school system since 1972.299 Having achieved
unitary status, the school board in 1985 adopted a student reassignment
plan (SRP) that eliminated mandatory busing for students in kindergarten
through grade four, instead assigning them based on neighborhood
attendance zones."' The plaintiffs sought to reopen the case and prevent
the implementation of the SRP because it would have resulted in the
substantial resegregation of Oklahoma City's elementary schools.3"'
Under the SRP, eleven of the city's sixty-four elementary schools would
have been more than ninety percent African-American, and twenty-two
would have been more than ninety percent white.02
The Supreme Court held that the school district was entitled to
implement the SRP, even if it would result in significant resegregation.0 3
It reasoned that requiring a school district that has achieved unitary status
to continue to comply with the district court's desegregation decree
would subject the district to judicial supervision "for the indefinite
future."3" According to the Court, "[n]either the principles governing the
entry and dissolution of injunctive decrees, nor the commands of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, require any such
Draconian result."3 5 It therefore concluded that a unitary school district
"no longer requires court authorization for the promulgation of policies
and rules regulating matters such as assignment of students and the
like."3 6 On remand, the district court returned control to local
authorities, the school district implemented the SRP, and Oklahoma
City's elementary schools became resegregated." 7
299. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 240-41.
300. Id. at 242.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 250.
304. Id. at 249.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 250.
307. See Dowell v. Board of Educ., 8 F.3d 1501 (10th Cir. 1993).
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At issue in Freeman was whether a district court could release a
formerly segregated school district from judicial supervision
incrementally prior to the district's full compliance with the
Constitution.3"' The DeKalb County School System (DCSS) had been
under federal court supervision since 1969, when the district court found
that the school system was operating in violation of Brown.3 9 At that
time, the school district was only 5.6 percent African-American.3"' In
response to the district court's finding of liability, the DCSS adopted a
neighborhood attendance zone policy that "effectively desegregated the
district for a period of time" with respect to student assignments.1
Seventeen years later, however, the demographics of DeKaib County had
changed dramatically; 47 percent of DCSS students were black, and, due
to a combination of de facto residential segregation and the district's
neighborhood attendance policy, m'nany schools in the system were
predominantly one-race.31 2
In 1986, the DCSS moved for a declaration of unitary status and final
dismissal of the case. 3 3 The district court found that tile DCSS had
eliminated the vestiges of the de jure system in four Green factor
areas3 '4-- student assignment, transportation, physical Tcilities, and
extracurricular activities-but that it remained unconstitutionally
segregated with respect to teacher and principal assignments and quality
of education.3"5 The district court accordingly returned control over the
four unitary areas to the DCSS while retaining supervision over the three
areas that remained unconstitutionally segregated.3"6 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that a district court could not
308. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,485 (1992).
309. Id. at 472-73.
310. Id. at 475.
311. Id. at 477.
312. Id. at 476; see also Joondeph, supra note 73, at 151-52.
313. Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
314. The "Green factors" (or "Green-type areas") are the primary facets of a school district's
operations that the Supreme Court has directed lower courts to use in evaluating whether school
systems have successfully desegregated and achieved unitary status. See Joondeph, supra note 73, at
152. The six traditional Green factors are student assignments, faculty assignments, staff
assignments, transportation, extracurricular activities, and physical facilities. See Freeman, 503 U.S.
at 486. They were born of the Court's opinion in Green v. County School Bcard, 391 U.S. 430
(1968), where the Court stated that the segregation of the school district "was complete, extending
not just to the composition of student bodies at the two schools but to every facet of school
operations-faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities." Id. at 435.
315. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 474.
316. Id. at 484.
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relinquish control over any part of a formerly segregated school system
until the school district had fully complied with the Constitution.1 7 The
court of appeals further ruled that the DCSS was constitutionally
required to mitigate the effects of resegregation caused by demographic
shifts until it had achieved such full compliance.318 It therefore ordered
the school district to consider several aggressive desegregation remedies
to achieve greater racial balance in student assignments, including the
pairing and clustering of schools, drastic gerrymandering of school
zones, grade reorganization, and busing."9
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and upheld the
district court's "incremental or partial withdrawal" of supervision over
the DCSS.320 The Court reasoned that "[t]he concept of unitariness has
been a helpful one in defining the scope of the district courts'
authority,"32' but that it does not restrict district courts' "inherent
capacity to adjust remedies in a feasible and practical way to eliminate
the conditions or redress the injuries caused by unlawful action." '322
Moreover, in the exercise of this discretion, district courts are obligated
to "provide an orderly means for withdrawing from control when it is
shown that the school district has attained the requisite degree of
compliance. 323 The Court accordingly concluded that incremental
withdrawal of judicial supervision was an "appropriate means' 324 for the
district court to fulfill its "duty to return the operations and control of
schools to local authorities. 325
In accordance with the Court's decision, the district court returned
control over the four unitary Green-type areas to the DCSS.326 Local
authorities were then free to implement policies in those areas as if the
school district had never been found liable for de jure segregation.327
That is, so long as its actions were not intentionally discriminatory, the
DCSS could take actions in the unitary facets of its operations that
317. Pitts, 887 F.2d at 1446-47.
318. Id. at 1448-49.
319. Id. at 1450.
320. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489.
321. Id. at 486.
322. Id. at 487.
323. Id. at 490.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 489.
326. See Pitts v. Freeman, 979 F.2d 1472, 1473 (11 th Cir. 1992).
327. Joondeph, supra note 73, at 164.
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actually aggravated existing racial imbalances, even though the school
district remained in violation of the Constitution.32 8 The DCSS was under
no obligation to ensure that each of the school district's Green-type areas
was effectively desegregated at the same time. This meant that,
depending on when each area becomes unitary, a formerly de jure school
district could go through the entire desegregation process aad be released
from judicial supervision without fully eliminating its schools' racial
identifiability.
329
Dowell and Freeman show that the result in Jenkins was by no means
aberrational. All three of the Rehnquist Court's primary school
desegregation decisions have produced outcomes detrimental to
extensive desegregation remedies and beneficial to returning control over
public school systems to local officials. This has been true even though
the Court has employed different, indeed contradictory, logic between
cases. Consider Freeman and Jenkins. Instrumental to the Court's
decision in Freeman was the breadth of a supervising district court's
discretion in school desegregation cases. The Court emphasized that
"[t]he term 'unitary' does not confine the discretion and authority of the
District Court in a way that departs from traditional equitable
principles, 30 and that district courts must be afforded flexibility in the
imposition of desegregation remedies "if [the] underlying principles [of
desegregation] are to be enforced with fairness and precision.""33 But in
Jenkins, the Court was anything but deferential to the district court's
supposedly "broad remedial authority. 332 The Court carefully scrutinized
the district court's decision to order salary assistance, overturning the
district court's nine-year-old factual finding regarding white flight.333
Moreover, it did so on the weak grounds that the finding was "both
inconsistent internally, and inconsistent with the typical supposition" that
white flight results from desegregation instead of segregation."4 It is
difficult to explain the Court's fluctuating attitude toward the breadth of
district courts' discretion in Freeman and Jenkins in terms other than
outcome.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 166-67.
330. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 487 (1992); see also id. ("That the term 'unitary' does not
have fixed meaning or content is not inconsistent with the principles that control the exercise of
equitable power.").
331. Id.
332. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2052 (1995).
333. See supra text accompanying note 277.
334. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2052.
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Also significant has been the Court's rhetoric in the three opinions.
While none of the decisions challenged or altered the principles of
Green, each contained language that tacitly supported lower courts'
abandonment of court-enforced desegregation. In Dowell, for instance,
the Court stated that, from its inception, "federal supervision of local
school systems was intended as a temporary measure." '335 It explained
that "[1]ocal control over the education of children allows citizens to
participate in decisionmaking, and allows innovation so that school
programs can fit local needs." '336 Thus, returning control to local
authorities "properly recognizes that 'necessary concern for the
important values of local control of public school systems dictates that a
federal court's regulatory control of such systems not extend beyond the
time required to remedy the effects of past intentional discrimination.' ' 337
The Court's opinion in Freeman contained similar language.33' The
Court began its analysis by reiterating that "'local autonomy of school
districts is a vital national tradition,' ' 339 and that judicial supervision of
formerly segregated school districts "was intended as a 'temporary
measure."' 3 ° The Court underscored that "[r]eturning schools to the
control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date is essential to
restore their true accountability in our governmental system."34' When
state and local authorities are responsible for administering public
schools "in the absence of judicial supervision, they can be held
accountable to the citizenry, to the political process, and to the courts in
,,342the ordinary course. Perhaps most telling, the Court identified the
"ultimate objective" in desegregation litigation not as the complete
335. Board ofEduc. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,247 (1991).
336. Id. at 248.
337. Id. (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.5 (9th Cir. 1979)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
338. Joondeph, supra note 73, at 158 ("The Freeman Court chose ... to emphasize the
importance of returning control to local authorities at the earliest practicable date."); The Supreme
Court, 1991 Term, supra note 276, at 257 ("The Freeman Court's deference to the findings,
conclusions, and actions of the district court is unmistakable. Justice Kennedy's opinion relied
heavily on the role of a district court's equitable discretion in formulating a desegregation remedy.").
339. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992) (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433
U.S. 406, 410 (1977) (Dayton /)); see also id. at 506 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("We must soon revert
to the ordinary principles of our law, of our democratic heritage, and of our educational tradition...
that public schooling, even in the South, should be controlled by locally elected authorities acting in
conjunction with parents.").
340. Id. at490 (quoting Board ofEduc. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,247 (1991)).
341. Id.
342. Id.
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desegregation of formerly de jure systems, but as "return[ing] school
districts to the control of local authorities.
343
Finally, the rhetoric of Jenkins also tacitly endorsed an end to court-
ordered desegregation. In addition to again reiterating that "'federal
supervision of local school systems was intended as a temporary
measure," '344 and that "local autonomy of school districts is a vital
national tradition, 3 45 the Court stated that "district court[s] must strive to
restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system
operating in compliance with the Constitution. 346 Moreover, the Court
reminded lower federal courts that, in the imposition of desegregation
remedies, they "must take into account the interests of state and local
authorities in managing their own affairs.'
347
Together, the outcomes and rhetoric of the Rehnquist Court's three
school desegregation decisions show how the Court's approach to
desegregation cases has changed. Not only have each cf the decisions
ended or significantly curtailed desegregation remedies, but they have
also contained language indicative of the Court's discomfort with
prolonged judicial supervision of formerly segregated school districts.
Instead of demanding all-out desegregation, the Court has extolled the
virtues of local control over public education. No longer does the Court
see district courts' encroachment on the control of local officials as a
necessary means to ensuring that the victims of segregation are made
whole and the vestiges of discrimination fully eradicated. Rather, the
343. Id. at 489.
344. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2049 (1995) (quoting Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247).
345. Id. at 2054.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 2049 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977) (Milliken 11)). In her
concurrence, Justice O'Connor added:
[I]n the school desegregation context, federal courts are specifically admonished to take into
account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, in light of the
intrusion into the area of education where States historically have been sovereign, and to which
States lay claim by right of history and expertise.
Id. at 2061 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Experience indicates that lower courts have taken the message of these three, decisions seriously.
As of mid 1996, at least six district courts had cited one of the aforementioned passages from
Dowell, Freeman, or Jenkins in finding that a formerly segregated school district had achieved
partial or total unitary status. See, e.g., Reed v. Rhodes, No. 1:73 CV 1300, 1996 WL 376873, at * 14
(N.D. Ohio May 8, 1996); Arthur v. Nyquist, 904 F. Supp. 112, 113 (W.D.N.Y. 1995); Keyes v.
Congress of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274, 1281-82 (D. Colo. 199.5); Coalition to Save
Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 901 F. Supp. 784, 794-95 (D. Del. 1995); Stell v. Board of Pub.
Educ., 860 F. Supp. 1563, 1577 (S.D. Ga. 1994); Tasby v. Woolery, 869 F. Supp. 454, 459 (N.D.
Tex. 1994).
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Court views judicial supervision as an impediment to political
accountability and local autonomy in the governance and administration
of public education. The Court accordingly starts from the implicit
premise that, unless school districts have acted in bad faith in the
implementation of their desegregation plans, district courts should return
control to state and local authorities. Jenkins, coming after Dowell and
Freeman, cements this shift in the Court's approach; it fully reveals the
Court's de facto abandonment of court-enforced desegregation.
VI. SCALIA, THOMAS, AND THE FAILURE TO JUSTIFY THE
COURT'S RETREAT
Although the change in the Court's approach to desegregation cases is
apparent, the underlying rationale for this shift is unclear. The Rehnquist
Court thus far has avoided altering or rejecting the doctrinal foundations
of court-ordered desegregation remedies, instead deciding its three
elementary and secondary school segregation cases on relatively narrow,
case-specific grounds. Jenkins exemplifies this tack. The decision
effectively ended court-ordered remedies in Kansas City, but primarily
on the limited ground that the district court erred in concluding that
segregation had caused white flight from the KCMSD.
In two recent opinions, however, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas
explicitly have challenged the two basic principles adopted by the Court
in Green. In a concurring opinion in Freeman, Justice Scalia contended
that, because Green's presumption of causation is based on empirical
assumptions that have grown obsolete, presuming that current conditions
are traceable to past discrimination no longer makes sense. And in his
concurrence in Jenkins, Justice Thomas argued that the Court should
abandon Green's corrective approach to remedies. According to Justice
Thomas, the corrective approach not only contradicts the original
meaning of Brown, but it encroaches on the important constitutional
principles of federalism and separation of powers, and it is implicitly
based on the belief that predominantly black schools are inherently
inferior.
Given the tension between the practical implications of the Court's
desegregation remedies jurisprudence and the Rehnquist Court's core
values-its exaltation of the principles of race-neutrality, federalism, and
judicial restraint 4S-it is possible that a majority of the Court has
implicitly endorsed either Justice Scalia's or Justice Thomas's argument.
348. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
HeinOnline  -- 71 Wash. L. Rev. 661 1996
Washington Law Review
Rejecting one or both of Green's two basic principles would dramatically
curtail the availability and extensiveness of desegregalion remedies, a
goal that the Court appears to have embraced. But the Court may be
unwilling to overrule part or all of Green because of school
desegregation's symbolic importance. Not only has the issue been an
important bellwether for the country's direction on civil rights, but
school desegregation, due to Brown's singular enormity, occupies a
unique place in the Court's history.
Moreover, the Rehnquist Court may be especially reticent to
reexamine Green in light of the backlash it suffered in response to its so-
called civil rights "rollback" decisions a few terms ago. In 1989, the
Court issued four rulings considered highly detrimental to civil rights
causes.349 For example, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,350 the
Court significantly heightened the requirements for recovery in disparate
impact cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, making
those claims essentially unwinnable for plaintiffs. And in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,35" ' the Court substantially restricted the
circumstances under which local and state governments could adopt
affirmative action programs. The Court received resouncing criticism for
the decisions, not just from the civil rights community, but from many
mainstream observers and commentators as well.352 Within two years,
349. Those decisions were, in chronological order, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989) (holding that supposedly benign racial classifications in state and local governments'
affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny, and that to show compelling interest, these
governments must demonstrate particularized findings of past discrimination in relevant community
and industry), Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding that statistical
disparities do not establish prima facie showing of disparate impact in Title VII claims, and that once
plaintiffs do make prima facie showing, burden that shifts to defendants is one of production, not
persuasion), Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that white employees not party to
consent decree have standing to attack affirmative action provisions in decree), and Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits discrimination
in formation and enforcement of contracts, but provides no relief for racially discriminatory working
conditions).
350. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
351. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
352. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Private Discrimination and Public Responsibility: Patterson in
Context, 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 4-5; The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103 Harv. L.
Rev. 137, 223-28, 314-20, 335-40 (1989); The Court, Still Haggling over Rights, N.Y. Times, June
16, 1989, at A2; Coyly, the Court Turns 180 Degrees, N.Y. Times, Juaw 12, 1989, at AI8;
Christopher Edley Jr. & Gene B. Sperling, Have We Really 'Done Enough 'fior Civil Rights?, Wash.
Post, June 25, 1989, at BI; Dorothy Gilliam, If Not the Court, Who?, Wash. Post, June 19, 1989, at
D3; Hendrik Hertzberg, Wounds of Race: Supreme Court Erodes Civil Rights, The New Republic,
July 10, 1989, at 4; Shaun L. Hill, Silent March to Protest Civil Rights Rulings, Wash. Post, July 23,
1989, at B6; Al Kamen, Rights Groups Plan Hill Counterattack: Supreme Court No Longer Seen as
Ally in Fighting Discrimination, Wash. Post, June 17, 1989, at A4; Judy Mann, Defending Symbols
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Congress overruled most aspects of the decisions as they affected Title
VII.
353
Nonetheless, even if the Court's recent desegregation decisions were
based implicitly on one of the rationales suggested by Justice Scalia or
Justice Thomas, the Rehnquist Court's course of action would still be
unjustified. These arguments provide a more analytically defensible
justification for curtailing the availability and breadth of desegregation
remedies, but neither countenances a rejection of either of Green's two
basic principles. The Green presumption properly recognizes that it
remains preferable to allocate the burden of proof regarding the cause of
current conditions to formerly de jure school districts rather than to the
victims of discrimination. And Green's corrective approach to remedies
appropriately reflects an understanding that the harms caused by de jure
segregation do not immediately cease once a school district abandons
intentional discrimination. Instead, the ongoing effects of discrimination
continue to influence the operations of school systems in a manner that
disadvantages African-Americans. To provide equal protection, school
districts must eliminate these remnants of discrimination. Consequently,
while the arguments offered by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas are
more candid and intellectually coherent than the Court's case-by-case
approach, they fail to justify the Court's abandonment of court-enforced
desegregation.
A. Discarding the Green Presumption of Causation
The Supreme Court never has justified explicitly the evidentiary
presumption that existing conditions in a nonunitary school district are
and Denying Justice, Wash. Post, June 30, 1989, at C3; Charles Mohr, Minority Advocates Fear
Gains Will Be Lost, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1989, at B5; Never Too Late for White Men, N.Y. Times,
June 14, 1989, at A26; Susan F. Rasky, Lawmakers Aiming at Reversing Bias Rulings, N.Y. Times,
June 14, 1989, at Al 8; William Raspberry, The 'Set-Aside' Reversal: Theory over Practice, Wash.
Post, Jan. 30, 1989, at A9.
353. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, overruled Patterson by
permitting the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages for discrimination in the terms and
conditions of employment. Id. § 102(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994)). And the Act
overruled most of Wards Cove by restoring the burden on employers after a plaintiff's prima facie
showing to one of persuasion, id. § 105(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)), and by
returning the rules concerning alternative business practices to "be in accordance with the law as it
existed on June 4, 1994"--the day before Wards Cove was decided, id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(k)(1)(C)). Indeed, Congress specifically stated in the preamble to the Act that "the decision
of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) has weakened the
scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections," and that "legislation is necessary to
provide additional protections against unlawful discrimination in employment." Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1071 § 2.
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causally related to that district's prior de jure segregation. There are
generally two reasons for creating an evidentiary presumption.3 First,
allocating the burden of proof to one party on a particular issue may be
more likely to produce a factually correct result.355 That is, the
presumption may be more likely to produce trial outcomes that, over
time, better approximate the truth. Second, a presumption may reflect a
judgment about which side is better able to bear the costs of error.356
Given that there will be great empirical uncertainty in a large percentage
of the cases, trials will often produce factually inaccurate outcomes
simply because the litigants are incapable of proving or disproving the
proposition. A presumption is justified where systematically erring in
favor of one party on the issue will further the interests of fairness and
justice.
In 1968, Green's presumption of causation made sense on both
grounds. As an empirical matter, it seemed clear that existing conditions
in formerly segregated school districts were directly traceable to the de
jure era. In school systems that had adopted "freedom of choice" plans, it
was evident that many African-Americans' choices were shaped by the
forces of past discrimination. As many commentators have noted, several
factors linked to de jure segregation likely tainted the decisions of
students in previously segregated school districts, systematically steering
them away from desegregated schools.357 Moreover, the recency of de
354. Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition, supra note 47, at 786.
355. Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence Under the Ruhs 753 (2d. ed. 1993)
("[W]e allocate [evidentiary] burdens so as to recognize what is most probably true."); Gewirtz,
Choice in the Transition, supra note 47, at 786; cf NLRB v. Baptist Hosp. Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 787
(1979) (stating that the validity of an evidentiary presumption depends on "'the rationality between
what is proved and what is inferred') (quoting Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793,
805 (1945)).
356. 1 David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mvueller, Federal Evidence § 68 (1977) (stating that
"[plresumptions exist for varying, and often overlapping reasons," and that "[s]ome presumptions
are based primarily on factors of procedural fairness"); Gewirtz, Choice in the Tansition, supra note
47, at 786.
357. For the most thorough discussion this idea, see Gewirtz, Choice in the Tansition, supra note
47, at 741-49. See also Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School Desegregation: Determination
of Unitary Status Based on the Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1105, 1128 (1990) (explaining that black families' choices in Green "had been conditioned by
established patterns of behavior and beliefs that were rooted in the invidious value"); Shane, supra
note 13, at 1052 (noting likelihood that "social circumstances partly resulting fiom past segregation
prevented blacks under freedom-of-choice plans from freely choosing to attend the schools they
most preferred"); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873. 901 (1987) (stating
that "[t]he Court's hostility to [free choice] plans depends at least in part on E, conclusion that the
preferences of whites and blacks are distorted by the history of discrimination").
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jure discrimination meant that there was hardly opportunity for
intervening forces or influences to undo the effects of years of
segregation. It was natural to presume a causal connection. 58
The Green presumption also made sense as a preferred allocation of
error costs. School districts in the South had been de jure segregators for
nearly one hundred years and had only abandoned intentionally
discriminatory policies within the last five years; New Kent County, for
instance, had been a de jure segregator until 1965. To the extent that
there were empirical uncertainties as to the cause of current conditions, it
was hardly fair to force the victims of segregation to bear the burden of
this uncertainty. Thus, once plaintiffs successfully established that the
school district was a de jure segregator, it was sensible as a matter of
justice and fairness to make the school districts bear the burden of
persuasion on the issue of causation.
Justice Scalia has contended, however, that the justifications for the
presumption are no longer nearly so compelling.359 In his concurring
opinion in Freeman, he acknowledged that, in 1968, the causal
presumption adopted in Green was "extraordinary in law but not
unreasonable in fact." 6' Specifically, "[t]he extent and recency of the
School districts' past discrimination likely tainted students' school choices in four discernible
ways. First, the ongoing effects of the de jure system, particularly the racial identifiability of the
schools, necessarily restricted students' options in exercising choice. See Gewirtz, Choice in the
Transition, supra note 47, at 742-44. Thus, in the immediate wake of de jure segregation, children in
New Kent County could not choose an integrated school; they could choose only between an all-
black school and a nearly all-white school. Second, the threat of retaliation or duress from whites
who opposed desegregation almost certainly influenced the decisions of some African-Americans.
Because free choice plans forced blacks to be the instigators of desegregation, the fear of predictable
discrimination and hostility from whites likely steered more African-Americans toward
predominantly black schools. See Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and American Law § 7.4.1 (3d ed.
1994); Sunstein, supra, at 901. Third, the long period of state-imposed segregation that had just
ended likely distorted some African-Americans' preferences, causing them to undervalue the
benefits of desegregation. See Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition, supra note 47, at 745. In other
words, individuals who had lived for many years under Jim Crow were unable to form their
preferences entirely independent of a value system still tainted by the effects of past discrimination.
See Sunstein, supra, at 901. Finally, given the lack of interaction between whites and blacks during
the de jure era, there likely were significant informational barriers that prevented individuals from
knowing what to expect at an integrated school. In light of the natural tendency to prefer the known
to the unknown, this lack of information caused more students to select schools in which they were
in the racial majority. See Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition, supra note 47, at 748.
358. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 33 (1976) ("In Green the causal connection between past
discrimination and the current racial composition of the schools was as clear as such matters ever can
be.").
359. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,500-07 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
360. Id. at 505.
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prior discrimination, and the improbability that young children (or their
parents) would use 'freedom of choice' plans to disrupt existing patterns"
justified presuming that predominantly one-race schools were the result
of the prior dual system.36' But Justice Scalia argued that, due to the
passage of time, circumstances have changed materially; "the rational
basis for the extraordinary presumption of causation simply must
dissipate as the de jure system and the school boards who produced it
recede further into the past." '362 So many intervening demographic
changes have influenced the racial composition of neighborhoods and
schools that de jure segregation "cannot realistically be assumed" a
significant cause of current conditions.363 "At some time, we must
acknowledge that it has become absurd to assume, without any further
proof, that violations of the Constitution dating from the days when
Lyndon Johnson was President, or earlier, continue to have an
appreciable effect upon current operation of schools."36
Clearly, the empirical bases for the presumption are much weaker
today than they were in 1968. As a school system's de jure violation
becomes more remote in time, the likelihood that current conditions in
the district are causally related to that violation diminishes
significantly.365 In school districts that use some form of school choice to
assign students, the risk that African-Americans' decisions are tainted by
the regime of de jure segregation has dissipated considerably. Moreover,
intervening demographic forces, such as normal migration, population
growth, and white flight from cities to suburbs, have substantially
influenced the operations and racial compositions of public schools.
When a school district's de jure violation is many years old, these
intervening factors may be a greater cause of current racial compositions
or levels of student achievement than past discrimination.366 Where the
violation ended forty years ago, such as in Jenkins, the probability of a
causal connection may be quite slim.
But this argument only addresses one of the two reasons for the Green
presumption--that it is more likely to produce an outcome that is
361. Id.
362. Id. at 506.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. See id. at 491 ("With the passage of time the degree to which racial imbalances continue to
represent vestiges of a.constitutional violation may diminish.").
366. See id. at 496 ("As the dejure violation becomes more remote in time and these demographic
changes intervene, it becomes less likely that a current racial imbalance in a school district is a
vestige of the prior dejure system.").
Vol. 71:597, 1996
HeinOnline  -- 71 Wash. L. Rev. 666 1996
Missouri v. Jenkins
factually accurate.3 67 The Green presumption remains a sound principle
because, in the face of this empirical uncertainty, it allocates the costs of
error preferably. Under the Green presumption, if current conditions are
actually unrelated to past discrimination but the school district is unable
to prove this, desegregation remedies and judicial supervision continue
when they actually should end. This error does have costs, as the Court
has taken pains to point out. It encroaches on state and local autonomy
and diminishes political accountability in the governance and
administration of public schools. In essence, it impinges on the
constitutional principle of federalism. But without the Green
presumption, the costs of error would be that equal protection violations
would go unremedied. If current conditions were traceable to de jure
segregation but the plaintiffs were unable to prove this causal link,
desegregation remedies would end prematurely. Judicial supervision
would cease even though vestiges of discrimination remained in the
school district, so that the victims of the ongoing effects of de jure
segregation would never be made whole.
While federalism clearly remains a vital constitutional principle, the
Fourteenth Amendment dictates that, within reason, equal protection
must take precedence. Inherent in the Equal Protection Clause's
command that "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" '368 is an invitation for federal
encroachment on state sovereignty. As the Court recognized this past
term in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,369 "the Fourteenth Amendment, by
expanding federal power at the expense of state autonomy, . .
fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by
the Constitution.""37 Indeed, the whole idea behind the Reconstruction
amendments (and the Civil War, for that matter) was that prohibiting
367. Justice Scalia stated that "[p]resumptions normally arise when proof of one fact renders the
existence of another fact so probable that it is sensible and timesaving to assume the truth of [the
inferred] fact.., until the adversary disproves it." Id. at 505 (citations and quotation marks omitted)
(alterations in original). He then took "sensible" to mean only sensible as a matter of factual
accuracy, not as an appropriate allocation of error costs.
368. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
369. 116S. Ct. 1114(1996).
370. Id. at 1125; see also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972) ("As a result of the
new structure of law that emerged in the post-Civil War era-and especially of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was its centerpiece-the role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of basic
federal rights against state power was clearly established."). But see Richard A. Posner, Overcoming
Law 220 (1995) ("The Reconstruction amendments do not on their face appear to revolutionize the
relation between the national government and the states; their principal thrust is to abolish the racial
caste system of the southern states.").
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official discrimination on the basis of race was more constitutionally
significant than preserving state autonomy from federal power.37' The
Green presumption thus appropriately reflects the constitutional
judgment that the costs of denying equal protection are more significant
than the costs of federal intrusion on state legislative or executive
discretion. In the face of empirical uncertainty, it is preferable to err in
favor of remedying the effects of state-imposed segregation than to
preserve state prerogatives against federal intrusion.372
Moreover, forcing formerly de jure school districts to bear the risks of
empirical uncertainty still properly reflects the relative culpability of the
371. The Supreme Court acknowledged this basic purpose of the Reconstruction amendments in
its first attempt to construe them, the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). While
taking a narrow view of the amendments' impact on the distribution of power between the federal
and state governments, a view that it has subsequently repudiated, the Slaughter-House Court at least
recognized that the Reconstruction amendments fundamentally altered the principle of federalism
with respect to protecting African-Americans from state-imposed discrimination:
[O]n the most casual examination of the language of these amendments, no one can fail to be
impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and
without which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave
race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly made
freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited
dominion over him.
Id. at 71. In dissent, Justice Field noted that the Fourteenth Amendment "was adopted ... to place
the common rights of American citizens under the protection of the National government." Id. at 93
(Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Bradley, also dissenting, expres:ed the implications
of the Reconstruction amendments on federalism in even clearer terms:
The question is now settled by the fourteenth amendment itself, that citizenship of the United
States is the primary citizenship in this country; and that State citizenship is secondary and
derivative ....
The right of a State to regulate the conduct of its citizens is undoubtedly a very broad and
extensive one, and not to be lightly restricted. But there are certain fundamental rights which
this right of regulation cannot infringe....
Id. at 112, 114 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
Finally, Justice Swayne wrote in his dissent that these amendments are all consequences of the
late civil war. The prejudices and apprehension as to the central govemmeni which prevailed
when the Constitution was adopted were dispelled by the light of experience. The public mind
became satisfied that there was less danger of tyranny in the head than of anarchy and tyranny in
the members.... The language employed is unqualified in its scope. There is r o exception in its
terms, and there can be properly none in their application.
Id. at 128 (Swayne, J., dissenting); see also I Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 95
(1991) (explaining that the Slaughter-House Court "recognized that the amendments revolutionized
traditional principles of federalism so far as blacks were concerned").
372. Cf Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 391-92 (1986) (stating that federal courts' intrusion
"deep into the normal jurisdiction of school superintendents and other local officials" through school
desegregation orders was largely unprecedented in American history, but that it was consistent with
"a perfectly traditional view of the judicial office" and was "largely a credit to law").
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parties. School districts may be less blameworthy than they were in
1968; the school board members and administrators who enacted and
implemented de jure policies have long since departed. And African-
American students in nonunitary districts may be less the victims of
discrimination than those black students who attended formerly de jure
schools in the immediate wake of state-imposed segregation; although
current students may encounter ongoing discriminatory effects of the
prior de jure regime, they are unlikely to face explicit discrimination
similar to that endured by black children in 1968. But formerly de jure
school districts clearly remain the wrongdoers relative to the plaintiffs;
the school districts are the proven constitutional violators, and the
students are (to the extent vestiges of discrimination remain) the victims
of intentional discrimination. Thus, the dictates of justice and fairness
still favor forcing school districts to bear the risk of empirical
uncertainties. 37
3
In short, while Justice Scalia's argument for discarding the Green
presumption rightly points out that the presumption's empirical bases are
weaker than they were in 1968, the presumption remains sound because
it dictates a preferable allocation of the costs of error. The unwarranted
continuation of judicial supervision over formerly segregated school
districts is a lesser evil than letting the vestiges of state-imposed
segregation go unremedied, and school districts, as proven constitutional
violators, remain blameworthy relative to desegregation plaintiffs. Thus,
although the case for the Green presumption may not be as strong today
as it was in 1968, it remains a sound basis for ordering the continuation
of extensive desegregation remedies aimed at rooting out the vestiges of
discrimination.
B. Rejecting Green's Corrective Approach to Desegregation Remedies
A second, more drastic means to reforming the Court's desegregation
doctrine, suggested by Justice Thomas in his concurrence in Jenkins,
would be to reject Green's other basic principle-the corrective
approach to desegregation remedies. According to this rationale, Brown
dictated that remedies for school segregation be purely prohibitory; the
Court endorsed a corrective approach in Green merely as a temporary
measure to overcome difficulties in enforcement. In addition, federal
373. Cf. Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, supra note 212, at 640 n.143 (contending that, where
white flight follows implementation of desegregation remedy, "to the extent that causation remains a
matter of empirical speculation, it seems appropriate to presume (rebuttably) that the govemment,
already a proven segregator, is responsible").
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courts' experience in implementing the corrective approach has exposed
its variance with established constitutional norms. Prolonged judicial
supervision of public school districts encroaches on the important
principles of federalism and the separation of powers, and the corrective
approach's mandate to eliminate all vestiges of discrimination implicitly
assumes that predominantly black schools are inherently inferior. For
each of these reasons, Justice Thomas has contended, the Court should
return to Brown's original, prohibitory meaning.
When the Court decided Green, its previous desegregation decisions
suggested a prohibitory approach to remedies. *By speaking
predominantly in terms of eliminating the harm inherent in the message
of state-imposed segregation, they implied that the de jure policies
themselves were the only harms warranting remedial action. None of
these cases suggested that the Constitution required school districts to
eliminate the ongoing effects of the dual system. Rather, they indicated
that the Constitution forbids school systems from assignirg any student
to a particular school on the basis of that student's race. 74
But even if the Court had believed Brown dictated this more limited
scope of remedies, it faced a practical dilemma. Allowing district courts
to do no more than prohibit future discrimination would have drastically
hindered efforts to force school districts to desegregate. Indeed, such a
holding likely would have permitted many school districts to evade
compliance with Brown completely.375 School boards would have had no
incentive to desegregate their schools until judicially ordered to do SO.3 76
Given the intense political pressure to resist desegregation, it was clear
that few southern school districts would have desegregated voluntarily.
Moreover, to gain compliance in recalcitrant school districts, plaintiffs
would have had to bear the onus of repeatedly filing actions to force a
cessation of de jure segregation.377
374. See supra notes 52- 64 and accompanying text.
375. Cf Ralph Cavanagh & Austin Sarat, Thinking About Courts: Toward and Beyond a
Jurisprudence of Judicial Competence, 14 L. & Soc'y Rev. 371, 408 (1980) (contending that often
traditional, prohibitory approach to remedies "provide[s] little more than symbolic victories," and
that "meaningful redress" is possible only "through 'intrusive' intervention").
376. Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition, supra note 47, at 739; Liebman, supra note 19, at 1529.
377. As James Liebman has explained:
[A] prohibitory approach... provides virtually no incentive for [a formerly segregated school
district] to refrain from choosing segregative school-assignment patterns: If the district does
discriminate a second time, it may well escape being sued; if it is sued, it probably will escape
liability; if it is found liable, it assuredly will face but a second injun-.tion forbidding
discrimination but allowing it yet again to formulate a new, perhaps only marginally different,
Vol. 71:597, 1996
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At the same time, it was apparent (if not provable in court) that school
boards like New Kent County's, which had enacted racially neutral
policies that maintained de facto segregation, were actually acting with
discriminatory intent."' For instance, it would have been much simpler
and more cost efficient for New Kent County to divide its school district
into two attendance zones and assign students to the school closer to their
homes.379 But such a plan would have resulted in actual desegregation.
So the County instead offered "free choice," maintaining its duplicative,
criss-crossing bus routes, knowing full well that it would maintain de
facto segregation.3"'
If the Court had endorsed the prohibitory approach, plaintiffs would
have had great difficulty obtaining relief for such discrimination
(technically de jure segregation) because of the challenges inherent in
assignment policy-which policy is even less likely to prompt a suit, which suit is even less
likely to succeed, and so on.
Liebman, supra note 19, at 1529.
378. See Armor, supra note 80, at 24 ("Although at first glance, freedom of choice appears to be a
race-neutral policy of student assignment, it was more often used to preserve racially separate
schools than to promote integration."); Derrick Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for
Racial Justice 1 I (1987) (calling freedom of choice plans "devices school boards and their lawyers
worked out to convey a sense of compliance with Brown, while in fact the schools remained
segregated"); Mark G. Yudof, Nondiscrimination and Beyond: The Search for Principle in Supreme
Court Desegregation Decisions, in School Desegregation: Past, Present, and Future 97, 99 (Water
G. Stephan & Joe R. Feagin eds., 1980) (explaining that "state and local bodies were ingenious in the
extreme in devising superficially neutral plans (pupil placement laws, ability grouping, freedom of
choice) which were subterfuxges for keeping the races separate in the public schools"). But see
Graglia, supra note 46, at 1157 (contending that by late 1960s "no one was any longer being barred
from any school-or, indeed, from any public facility").
379. In a concurring opinion to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Green, Judge Sobeloff explained:
In view of the situation found in New Kent County, where there is no residential segregation,
the elimination of the dual school system and the establishment of a 'unitary, non-racial system'
could be readily achieved with a minimum of administrative difficulty by means of geographic
zoning-simply by assigning students in the eastern half of the county to the New Kent School
and those living in the western half of the county to the Watkins School.
Bowman v. County Sch. Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 332 (4th Cir. 1967) (en banc) (Sobeloff, J., concurring),
rev'd, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); see also Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 n.6 (1968)
(quoting same); cf Lino A. Graglia, Disaster by Decree. The Supreme Court Decisions on Race and
the Schools 78 (1976) ("Freedom of choice in school selection was a method very rarely employed
except in districts required to end segregation. In operation it is cumbersome and expensive-often
to the point of unworkability.").
380. Bowman, 382 F.2d at 332 (Sobeloff, J., concurring) ("[I]t is evident that here the Board, by
separately busing Negro children across the entire county to the 'Negro' school, and the white
children to the 'white' school, is deliberately maintaining a segregated system which would vanish
with non-racial geographic zoning."); see also Green, 391 U.S. at 442 n.6 (quoting the same);
Yudof, supra note 378, at 105 (stating that "[o]nly a fool would need to search the official records
for evidence of racial prejudice under [the] circumstances" of Green).
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proving invidious intent in the adoption of facially neutral policies.
Conceivably, courts might have inferred discriminatory intent in cases
like Green, where the availability of less burdensome and more effective
desegregation remedies was abundantly clear. But in the majority of
cases, where the school board's continued intentional discrimination was
less obvious, requiring proof of invidious intent would have imposed a
substantial burden on plaintiffs who already faced other significant
obstacles in obtaining desegregation.3"'
According to this understanding of Green, the Coutt adopted the
corrective approach to desegregation remedies not as a faithful
interpretation of Brown but as a transitional regime necessary for the
implementation of any version of desegregation. In Justice Thomas's
words, it was a "temporary" solution to be "used only to overcome the
widespread resistance to the dictates of the Constitution."3"2 Because
school districts continued to resist desegregation, their motives in
adopting race-neutral plans that preserved de facto segregation were
highly suspect. Unless school boards' policies actually produced
integration, there simply was not sufficient cause to believe that their
decisions were uncorrupted by discrimination. Mandating actual
integration was necessary as a prophylactic measure for courts to verify
that school districts had abandoned de jure segregation. 3 ' Under this
,381. See Bell, supra note 378, at 111.
382. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038,2067 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
383. Among commentators on the subject, only Ronald Dworkin has endorsed a reading of Green
similar to this. See Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights-the Consequences
of Uncertainty, 6 J. L. & Educ. 3, 11-12 (1977). Dworkin has contended that constitutional "rights
are based on antecedent probabilities," so that "the equal protection clause . . . provides that no
decisions with a high antecedent probability of corruption though [sic] prejudice should be left to the
normal political process." Id. at 10-11. In a community that has recently shown prejudice toward
African-Americans through state-imposed segregation, there is a strong antecedent probability that
the political decisions determining the assignment of students to public schools will be corrupted. Id.
at 11. Unless the background of prejudice has truly dissipated, the only way to ensure that the school
district's student assignment plan was not tainted by prejudice in the political rocess would be to
require the plan to be "of a sort itself to negate the charge of corruption." Id. at 2. Green's mandate
to integrate therefore works as an order to school boards that implicitly says the fbllowing:
If you refuse yourself to produce an outcome that negates the antecedtnt probability of
corruption, then we must impose on you such an outcome. The only decsion that we can
impose, given the nature of the problem, is a decision that requires integratior on some formula
that is evidentially not corrupt even if it is just as evidently arbitrary.
Id. Thus, "[u]ntil the background changes," such that we are no longer presumptively convinced that
the political process is corrupted by discrimination, "integration is required as th2 only thing that can
sustain the burden of proof rising from the antecedent probability of corruption." Id.; see also
Liebman, supra note 19, at 1532-39 (discussing Dworkin's "prophylaxis" explanation for the
Supreme Court's desegregation remedies decisions).
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rationale, the corrective approach is not a fixed principle of constitutional
law. Rather, its continuing vitality is necessarily contingent on the
existence of the practical circumstances justifying its creation."' When
those circumstances no longer exist--that is, when courts are confident
that school systems will implement desegregation remedies in good
faith--the transitional regime is no longer necessary.
If this were the sole justification for the corrective approach to
desegregation remedies, it would probably be time to adopt a different
approach. First, because public attitudes toward state-imposed
segregation and discrimination have changed dramatically since 1968,
there is less reason to be suspicious of the motives of school authorities
in formerly de jure school districts. Explicit racial discrimination has not
only lost the political appeal it enjoyed in 1968, but it has actually
become affirmatively distasteful to most voters, an embarrassment to
communities when uncovered. Second, African-Americans now play a
more prominent role in the political process, mitigating the fear that local
authorities will be unresponsive to blacks' desires in the governance and
administration of public schools.38 For these reasons, outright resistance
to desegregation has become much less likely, alleviating the concern
that school systems' race-neutral policies are implicitly motivated by
intentional discrimination. Opponents of the corrective approach
accordingly contend that mandating the elimination of all effects of past
discrimination is no longer necessary to implement Brown's true
command: that public school districts cease intentionally discriminating
on the basis of race.
Opponents further argue that the corrective approach's variance with
the Constitution has become more apparent through experience in its
implementation. According to Justice Thomas, federal courts' imposition
For critiques of Dworkin's argument, see Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition, supra note 47, at 739
n.33 (contending that Dworkin's prophylactic explanation for mandate to integrate is "curious"
because it rests on general predicate-i.e., one assumed to be applicable to all formerly segregated
school districts-rather than one based on specific recalcitrance of particular defendant), and Yudof,
supra note 378, at 105-07 (arguing that Dworkin's theory fails to justify remedy--mandatory
integration-when harm is not denial of integrated education but infection of political process by
prejudice).
384. Dworkin, supra note 383, at 12 (stating that when "the background changes in one of two
ways, [when] our sense of prejudice abates or blacks have the political power to make decision in
question," mandate to desegregate would no longer be necessary).
385. See Klarman, supra note 26, at I I (noting that "southern blacks have advanced from nearly
universal exclusion from the political community to participation rates roughly comparable to those
of southern whites of similar economic class, with concomitant increases in the responsiveness of
public officials to the interests of the black community").
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of corrective desegregation remedies "has trampled upon principles of
federalism and the separation of powers." '386 The corrective approach has
led to federal judicial supervision over hundreds of public school
districts, lasting for as long as thirty years in many communities.387 It has
thrust federal courts into the role of public school administrators,
involving them in school systeras' day-to-day decisions regarding
attendance zones, financing, transportation, capital improvements, and
curricula.38 Such intrusion by the federal governmtent into the
administration of public education, Justice Thomas argues, has
"strip[ped] state and local governments of one of their most important
governmental responsibilities, . . . thus deny[ing] their existence as
independent governmental entities."3 9 Moreover, the corrective approach
has required supervising district courts to perform largely executive and
legislative functions. Not only do courts lack the expertise to exercise
these powers, but this disregard for the appropriate separation of powers
"detracts[s] from the independence and dignity of the federal courts.' 390
Thus, the corrective approach has allowed federal courts to exercise
discretion far in excess of that authcrized by the Constitution.
Finally, some opponents have contended that the corrective approach
rests on a morally unjustifiable premise--that predominantly black
schools are inherently inferior.39' Under Green's framework, racially
imbalanced (or "racially identifiable") schools in a nonunitary school
district are presumptively vestiges of past discrimination. The corrective
approach therefore requires school districts to affirmatively integrate
these schools, even if they are identical to all other schools in the system
in every respect other than racial composition. But what exactly is the
harm that justifies remedial measures under these circumstances? Justice
Thomas has contended that, if a school district has abandoned de jure
segregation and its schools receive equal resources, requiring the
integration presumes that African-Americans suffer an injury purely by
attending a predominantly black school.392 This reasoning, he has argued,
386. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2062 (Thomas, J., concurring).
387. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
388. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2070 (Thomas, J., concurring).
389. Id.
390. Id. at 2071.
391. See id. at 2061; Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure
Segregation to Replicate the Disease?, 78 Corn2l L. Rev. 1, 6 (1992) (contending that Supreme
Court's "remedies for de jure segregation are based upon an assumption of African-American
inferiority-the same assumption that pervaded the constitutional violation of dejure segregation").
392. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2065-66 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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"assume[s] that anything that is predominantly black must be inferior."393
That is, "segregation injures blacks because blacks, when left on their
own, cannot achieve." '394 As such, the corrective approach has produced
"a jurisprudence based upon a theory of black inferiority."395
The argument for rejecting the corrective approach to desegregation
remedies offers an intriguing explanation for why the Court may have
endorsed this principle in Green. As an historical matter, it seems quite
possible that practical circumstances concerning the enforcement of
Brown led some of the justices to concur in requiring school districts to
eliminate the ongoing effects of past discrimination rather than just to
abandon de jure segregation. But even if this were the case, the
corrective approach may still be a sound principle of constitutional law.
Its validity turns not on the implicit reasons for the Court's original
adoption of it, but on whether it represents the best possible
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause. If the corrective approach
is the best means to assuring that the victims of school segregation are
afforded equal protection, then the unarticulated motivations of the Court
in Green are irrelevant.
The foundation of Justice Thomas's argument is that the only harm of
segregation is the violation itself--the "classiffication of] students based
on their race., 396 Once the school district has ceased intentionally
discriminating on the basis of race, any constitutional harms from
segregation cease to exist. Current conditions in the school district, such
as de facto segregation or reduced achievement by African-American
students, have no constitutional significance, even if they are directly
traceable to the de jure system. In Green, for instance, had the Court
been able to determine that the school board had acted in complete good
faith, the county's freedom of choice plan would have satisfied its
constitutional obligations, and any further remedies would have been
unwarranted.
393. Id. at 2061; see also Graglia, supra note 46, at 1171 (contending that district court's remedial
order in Swan, which effectuated Green's corrective approach by mandating integration through
busing, "was based on the erroneous theory that predominantly black schools are unconstitutional
because inherently inferior"); cf. Shane, supra note 13, at 1059-60 (recognizing that there are
"philosophical objections to the proposition that all-black schools are inherently harmful," largely
because it "erroneously implies that black political autonomy has no positive value").
394. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2065 (Thomas, J., concurring).
395. Id. at 2066.
396. Id. at 2065.
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But as many commentators have noted, such a view conceives of
segregation's harm far too narrowly. 97 The harm is; not just the
discriminatory policy itself, the formal inequality of treatment inherent in
official classifications based on race. School segregation also inflicts
tangible injuries on the disfavored group by producing disadvantages that
continue well after the abandonment of state-imposed discrimination.
Indeed, segregation infects the civic institution of public education with
racism.3 98 It causes pervasive and systemic harms that, until fully
uprooted, continue to influence the operation of public school systems in
a racially discriminatory manner.
The corrective approach properly recognizes that the vestiges of the de
jure system continue to unconstitutionally disadvantage African-
Americans after the school district has abandoned its intentionally
discriminatory policies. Consider racial imbalances that persist following
de jure segregation. These imbalances influence the myriad decisions
throughout the community that affect the school system's operations. For
instance, students may wish to attend an integrated school, but if the
system's schools remain predominantly one-race, their only choice will
be between predominantly white and predominantly black schools. In
these circumstances, students and families are likely to pr.efer schools in
which they are a racial majority, even if their first choice would be an
integrated school. Offering such restricted choices would be especially
unjust to the victims of segregation, who may be effectively forced to
choose predominantly African-A-erican schools, regardless of their
personal preferences, due to the predictable hostility and duress that they
would suffer as a small minority at predominantly white schools.3 99
State-imposed segregation also distorts a community's perceptions in
a way that cannot be undone simply through the abandonment of de jure
policies. De jure segregation contains a clear social message: that whites
are superior to African-Americans, and that interaction with blacks is
undesirable. School segregation in particular unmistakably signals that
white schools provide a better education than black schools.4"0 If schools
remain identifiably white and black in the wake of de jure segregation,
397. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 358, at 35-36; Gewirtz, Choice in the Tran.rition, supra note 47,
at 739; Liebman, supra note 19, at 1524-32.
398. Liebman, supra note 19, at 1541 ("The problem with segregation ... is legislative racism,
racism infecting political judgments about how organized society should allocate scarce resources,
educational or otherwise.").
399. See id. at 744-45; Sunstein, supra note 357, at 901.
400. See Brest, supra note 358, at 37; Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition, supra note 47, at 745-
48; Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 828, 857 (1983).
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individuals in the community will continue to make decisions based on
these perceptions--perceptions shaped by the government's de jure
policies. People are apt to continue to use the schools' racial composition
as a proxy for their quality.41' This, in turn, will affect where the most
qualified teachers decide to accept jobs, where families decide to buy
homes, and which schools the highest achieving students wish to attend.
So long as these perceptions persist, de facto segregation will steer
educational resources (in the form of highly qualified teachers, the best
students, and even the affluence of students' families) disproportionately
toward the predominantly white schools. Thus, de facto segregation that
perpetuates these perceptions systematically undermines the quality of
education in predominantly African-American schools.
If these many private decisions affecting a school district's operations
were based on factors unrelated to de jure segregation, they would be of
no constitutional significance. The Fourteenth Amendment only reaches
intentionally discriminatory state action,402 and these decisions are
private acts, even when motivated by intentional discrimination. But if
those decisions are directly influenced by perceptions in the community
and conditions in the school district created by the district's prior de jure
policies, the decisions are themselves products of unconstitutional
discrimination. And where those decisions produce outcomes that
disadvantage African-Americans, those outcomes represent
constitutional violations;4 3  they are ongoing cognizable harms
"ultimately... trace[able] to a racially discriminatory purpose."4
The point is clearer in cases like Jenkins, where the harm caused by de
jure segregation is a reduction in the level of student achievement. If low
student achievement is a vestige of the de jure system, then current
educational outcomes in the district are below what they would have
401. See Christine H. Rossell, Desegregation Plans, Racial Isolation, White Flight, and
Community Response, in The Consequences of School Desegregation 13, 51 (Christine H. Rossell &
Willis D. Hawley, eds. 1983) (finding that "[i]n forming opinions, whites appear to rely on racial
composition... as [a] surrogate[ ] for quality").
402. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239 (1976).
403. See Schnapper, supra note 400, at 858 ("When governmental discrimination creates
continuing social or physical conditions, each injury caused by those conditions is a fresh
constitutional violation.").
404. Davis, 426 U.S. at 240. Eric Schnapper has similarly noted that the persistence of a
predominantly black school's racial identifiablility in the wake of de jure segregation represents "a
constitutionally impermissible badge of inferiority. That label, having been placed on the school and
its black students by systematic de jure segregation, can be removed only by altering the composition
of the student body." Schnapper, supra note 400, at 857.
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been had there never been state-imposed segregation. That is, student
achievement remains artificially low precisely because oftpast intentional
discrimination by the school system. The school system's educational
process therefore represents an ongoing constitutional violation. Only
after the school district has eliminated this effect of its past
discrimination has it truly remedied the constitutional violation. Until
then, harms wrought by the school district's de jure segregation will
persist.
Once one accepts that the Constitution ordains a corrective approach
to desegregation remedies, the responses to the remainder of Justice
Thomas's contentions are straightforward. Prolonged federal judicial
supervision of formerly de jure school districts does impinge on the
principles of federalism and the separation of powers, but it does so to
ensure the vindication of another constitutional principle--that the
victims of intentional discrimination be afforded equal protection of the
laws. To say that the Court should abandon the corrective approach
because it violates the norms of federalism and the separation of powers
is to value those principles over equal protection.
This argument fails for the same reasons that Justice Scalia's rejection
of the Green presumption founders. The text of the Fourteenth
Amendment mandates that, within certain limits, affording African-
Americans equal protection must be valued over federalism. The Equal
Protection Clause memorialized the collective judgment that federal
encroachment on state prerogatives, when necessary to remedy identified
acts of racial discrimination, is not only legitimate but actually promotes
the values of the Constitution.405 Thus, there simply is no room for
arguing that when the principles of federalism and equal protection
collide, federalism should prevail. More specifically, prolonged judicial
supervision over formerly segregated school districts cannot be
illegitimate simply because it tramples on states' legislative and
executive authority. Rather, if extensive desegregation remedies are
necessary to ensure that all citizens are afforded equal protection of the
laws, then state autonomy must yield.
With respect to the principle of separation of powers, federal
encroachment on state autonomy to enforce the Equal Protection Clause
is constitutionally legitimate whether accomplished by Congress, the
executive, or the courts. While section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
expressly grants Congress the power to enact "appropriate legislation" to
405. See supra note 371 and accompanying text; see also Ackerman, supra note 371, at 44-47.
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enforce the Amendment's provisions,4 6 the Amendment otherwise
makes no distinction between legislative, executive, and judicial powers.
For reasons of institutional competence, Congress may be best equipped
to devise effective solutions to problems created by pervasive racial
discrimination. But nothing in either the Fourteenth Amendment or
Article III prohibits the federal judiciary from enforcing the commands
of equal protection. The license to infringe on state legislative and
executive discretion granted to the federal government by the Fourteenth
Amendment applies as much to the courts as it does to Congress or the
President, especially when the elective branches have generally
eschewed a leading role in enforcement. Thus, while judicial remedies to
school segregation may be less efficient than congressional or executive
action, they are perfectly legitimate under the Constitution.
Moreover, it is important to keep in mind what precipitated federal
judicial intrusion in the first place. Federal courts assumed control of
formerly de jure school districts precisely because the legislative and
executive branches of state and local governments were invidiously
discriminating against African-Americans. The democratic process had
completely broken down, systematically disadvantaging and oppressing
blacks. Segregation, coupled with terrorism that was at least tacitly
condoned by local governmental officials, had disenfranchised African-
Americans, preventing them from protecting themselves through the
political process. Insulating segregated school systems from majoritarian
control was therefore necessary to remedy the harms of segregation.
Suspending democratic governance for some period was essential to
ensuring that school boards abandoned their de jure policies and
implemented plans designed to eliminate the effects of discrimination.
Thus, to criticize the corrective approach for undermining political
accountability in the governance of public schools is, at a basic level,
merely to condemn it for having achieved its objectives.40 7
It is conceivable that, at some point, the vestiges of discrimination in a
school district will be so remote or intractable that the costs of removing
them, in terms of infringing on the principles of federalism and the
separation of powers, will outweigh the value in adhering to the strict
commands of equal protection. Given courts' limited institutional
competence, some lingering effects of the de jure system may ultimately
406. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
407. Moreover, where state-imposed segregation existed for nearly one hundred years, as it did in
most southern and border states, federal judicial intrusion for twenty to thirty years hardly seems
disproportionate.
679
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be unremediable through court-enforced desegregation. But recognizing
such limits hardly means that courts should jettison the corrective
approach entirely. Rather, it merely counsels courts to make certain that
the vestiges for which they order remedies have a "real and substantial
relation to a de jure violation,"40 8 and can be practicably removed from
the school system through court-ordered remedies. Nothing in the
corrective approach necessarily restricts district courts' discretion to
withdraw judicial supervision once court-ordered remedies are incapable
of removing those vestiges of discrimination that might remain.
Finally, the contention that the corrective approach implicitly assumes
that predominantly black schools are inherently inferior misunderstands
the reasons for requiring actual desegregation. The corrective approach
does not demand desegregation because predominantly black schools
necessarily provide a lower quality of education, or because African-
Americans will have more difficulty achieving when they are racially
isolated. Rather, it requires effective desegregation because de facto
segregation traceable to the de jure system tends to distort
decisionmaking in a manner that produces outcomes disadvantageous to
blacks. Until schools are actually desegregated, so that the causal link
between the racial composition of the district's schools and de jure
segregation is broken, we cannot be confident that racially imbalanced
schools are a product of students' and families' free choices. Clearly,
there is nothing inherently inferior in predominantly black schools. But if
those schools' racial isolation is directly traceable to the prior de jure
system, a period of complete desegregation is necessary to ensure that
decisions affecting the school district's operations are no longer
influenced by past discrimination, and that racial imbalances are the
product of families' choosing predominantly one-race schools free from
the taint of unconstitutional segregation.
In sum, none of the reasons offered by Justice Thomas justify
rejecting the corrective approach to desegregation remedies. Replacing
the corrective approach with a purely future-oriented, prohibitory
approach would ignore how the ongoing effects of past discrimination
continue to discriminate against African-Americans in formerly de jure
school districts. Even if the Court's decision in Green was indeed the
product of pragmatic concerns pertaining to enforcement, Green's two
basic principles remain sound constitutional law. While the remedial
framework mandated by those principles impinges to sorre extent on the
norms of federalism and the separation of powers, it properly recognizes
408. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,496 (1992).
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that failing to fully remedy state-imposed segregation would be a greater
evil. Hence, while the arguments posited by Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas provide more analytically defensible rationales for curtailing
desegregation remedies, they scarcely vindicate the Supreme Court's
quiet revolution.
VII. CONCLUSION
It remains possible that Jenkins will prove rather insignificant, the
resolution of two discrete and relatively straightforward issues in
desegregation law. But the flaws in the Court's reasoning suggest
otherwise. Jenkins, together with Dowell and Freeman, reveals that the
Court's approach to school desegregation cases has changed. No longer
does the Court focus on the effectiveness of the desegregation remedies
in eliminating the vestiges of de jure discrimination "root and branch."'"4 9
Instead, it emphasizes that court-enforced desegregation was intended to
be a "temporary measure,"4 ° and that local control of elementary and
secondary education is "a vital national tradition.".4". The Court's primary
concern appears to be what it has termed the "ultimate objective" in
desegregation cases: "to return school districts to the control of local
authorities." '412
Ten years ago, Paul Gewirtz wrote about school desegregation that "at
some point-perhaps in words that could connote either triumph or
despair--the [C]ourt will come to say: it is finished., 413 That point has
arrived, but the Supreme Court has failed to deliver any accompanying
words of triumph or despair. Instead of confronting the precepts of its
desegregation jurisprudence directly and explaining its hostility to
extensive court-ordered remedies, the Court is ending this important
chapter in our constitutional history subtly and without words. The long
and celebrated era of court-ordered desegregation will soon fade quietly,
remembered as an enormous, contentious, and largely unsuccessful effort
to remedy persisting racial inequalities in public education.
409. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,438 (1968).
410. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,247 (1991).
411. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2054 (1995).
412. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489.
413. Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition, supra note 47, at 798.
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